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THE RHETORIC OF MODERATION:
DESEGREGATING THE SOUTH DURING
THE DECADE AFTER BROWN
Davison M. Douglas*
The choice is not between segregation and integration; it is between
some integration and total integration. . . . [If we resist all integration], it
is a foregone conclusion that the winner will be total integration, or that
the schools will be closed. . . . Token integration ... will save the state
and save the schools. . . . This is moderation.
-North Carolina State Judge Braxton Craven, 19601

J.

INTRODUCTION

For decades, the South's2 massive resistance to the Supreme
Court's Brown v. Board of Education3 decision has fascinated scholars. 4 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision striking down
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, William and Mary. A.B.,
Princeton University; J.D., Ph.D., Yale University. I would like to thank Neal Devins, Mary
Dudziak, William Link, James Paul, Russell Pearce, and Eric Stein for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank my research assistants Erin Hawkins, Fred
Jacob, and Manesh Rath.
1 Braxton Craven, Legal and Moral Aspects of the Lunch Counter Protests, CHAPEL HILL
WKLY., Apr. 28, 1960, at lB (emphasis added).
2 Unless otherwise noted, for purposes of this Article references to the "South" include the
eleven states of the old Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
3 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
4 See, e.g., NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS
IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969); JAMES W. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD ORGANIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1976); ROBIN L.
GATES, THE MAKING OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: VIRGINIA'S POLITICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1954-1956 (1962); BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF
INTEGRATION SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION (1964); BENJAMIN MuSE, VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1961); REED SARRATT, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION: THE
FIRST DECADE (1966); FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1973); J.
HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME CoURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979); Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 193 (1964); Walter Gellhorn, A Decade of
Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 UTAH L. REv. j (1964); Robert B. McKay, "With All
Deliberate Speed": Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development 1956-1957, 43 VA. L. REv.
1205 (1957); Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of School Desegregation,
31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1956); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School
Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978); Note, The Federal
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school segregation, more than half of the states of the old Confederacy-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia-defied the Court by denying the legitimacy of the Brown
decision and doing all that they could to resist its implementation; two
other southern states-Arkansas and Florida-also engaged in some
defiance of the Court, although they allowed pupil mixing in at least a
few of their schools without a court order to do so. Each of these
states enacted an interposition resolution claiming the Brown decision
to be illegitimate and unworthy of compliance;5 each also enacted substantial legislation aimed at thwarting efforts to integrate schools
within their borders.6 And, at least in the short term, this defiance
Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962).
5 Interposition and Nullification-Alabama, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 437 (1956) Goint resolution declaring Brown decision "null and void"); Interposition and Nullification-Arkansas, 1
RAcE REL. L. REP. 1116 (1956) (constitutional amendment approved by voters); Interposition
and Nullification-Florida, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 707 (1957) Goint resolution); InterpositionLouisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 753 (1956) Goint resolution); Interposition and NullificationMississippi, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 440 (1956) Goint resolution); Interposition and NullificationSouth Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 443 (1956) Goint resolution); Interposition and Nullification-Virginia, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 445 (1956) Goint resolution).
The legislatures of Texas and North Carolina did not adopt an interposition resolution. The
Tennessee House of Representatives adopted an interposition resolution, but it was not ratified
by the Senate. Interposition and Nullification-Tennessee, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 228 (1957).
6 The following are examples of some of this legislation. Public Schools-Alabama, 1 RAcE
REL. L. REP. 717 (1956) (discussing Act No. 117, Apr. 14, 1956 which required local school
boards to provide segregated schools for those parents who want them); Public Schools-Arkansas, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 453 (1957) (discussing Act No. 84, Feb. 26, 1957 which eliminated
compulsory attendance law where attendance in a racially mixed school is required); Public
Schools-Arkansas, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 390 (1959) (discussing Act No. 151, Mar. 3, 1959 which
provided for payment of tuition to private schools for students assigned to integrated schools);
Public Schools-Florida, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1149 (1957) (discussing Chapter 1975 of the 1957
Acts, Oct. 25, 1957 which provided for closing of schools when federal military forces are employed near a school); Compulsory Attendance-Florida, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 753 (1959) (discussing Chapter 59-412, June 19, 1959 which eliminated compulsory attendance law where
attendance in a racially mixed school is required); Public Schools-Georgia, 1 RAcE REL. L.
REP. 418 (1956) (discussing Act No. 11, Feb. 6, 1956 which granted the Governor discretion to
close local schools); School Closing-Georgia, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 181 (1959) (discussing Act
No.7, Feb. 3, 1959 which authorized tuition grants when schools are closed); Public SchoolsLouisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956) (discussing Act 555, 1954 which provided that operation of integrated school violates criminal code); Public Schools-Louisiana, 1 RACE REL. L.
REP. 728 (1956) (discussing House Bill No. 438, June 21, 1956 which eliminated compulsory
attendance law for integrated schools); Public Schools-Mississippi, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 422
(1956) (discussing House Bill No. 31, Feb. 24, 1956 which repealed requirement of compulsory
education); Public Schools-Mississippi, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 480 (1957) (discussing Chapter
254, 1956 which prohibited any state official from attempting to integrate the schools); Public
Schools-South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 241 (1956) (discussing Acts of 1955 which eliminated funding for any school to which a student had been transferred under court order); Public
Schools-Virginia, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1091 (1956) (discussing Chapter 56, 71, Sept. 29, 1956
which mandated cutoff of state funds to school districts with integrated schools and contained a
provision for tuition grants to those students whose public schools are closed).
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succeeded. On the fifth anniversary of the Brown decision, no black
child had ever attended school with white children in any of these
defiant states with the limited exceptions of Virginia and Arkansas.
On the tenth anniversary of Brown, still no black child in Mississippi
had ever attended school with white children and only a handful of
black children in the other defiant states had gained entry into a white
schooJ.7 Much of the scholarship of the post-Brown era has attempted
to explain this massive resistance and to speculate on the reasons for
its success.s
However, not every southern state pursued a strategy of complete resistance to the Brown decision. Scholars have paid less attention to those few southern states that engaged in token integration
during the first few years after Brown. The white political leaders in
these "moderate" states-primarily North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Texas-appeared to accept, at least in principle, the Brown decision's
legitimacy while seeking to avoid its reach. 9
7 SoUTHERN EDuc. REPoRTING SERV., STATISTICAL SuMMARY OF ScHOOL SEGREGATIONDESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 27, 29 (1965).
8 See generally BARTLEY, supra note 4; MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4; WILHOIT, supra note 4; WILKINSON, supra note 4; JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEw AMERICAN
DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ScHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984).
Much of this scholarship has focused on the role of the Supreme Court in this process.
Some scholars have laid part of the blame for the success of massive resistance at the feet of the
Supreme Court for its refusal to confront the resistance to its mandate in Brown in a meaningful
way. STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES (1977); WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 78-79. More recently, at least two scholars have argued that the successful resistance to Brown demonstrates
the comparative insignificance of the courts in fostering racial change in this country as compared to the legislative and executive branches of government. GERALD N. RosENBERG, THE
HoLLow HoPE: CAN CouRTS BRING ABoUT SociAL CHANGE? (1991); Michael J. Klarman,
Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, SO VA. L. REv. 7 (1994).
9 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 144; WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 78-79. This distinction between "moderate" and "defiant" states is admittedly somewhat simplistic. Political leaders in all
11 southern states opposed pupil mixing; they differed, however, in the extent to which they
were willing to go to preserve segregated schools.
As a general rule, the defiant states placed no limitations on their willingness to resist the
Brown decision whereas political leaders in the moderate states were willing at least to some
modest extent to balance their desire to avoid all pupil mixing with other concerns. Yet within
all of the moderate states, there were those who favored resistance to the Brown decision at all
costs. For example, in east Texas, resistance was far stronger than in the western part of the
state. Likewise, in each of the "defiant" states, a handful of white leaders opposed massive
resistance.
For purposes of this Article, the distinction between the moderate and defiant states is measured in terms of (1) at what point in time the state engaged in token integration without court
order; (2) whether the state adopted an interposition resolution challenging the authority of the
Supreme Court; and (3) the nature of the legislative agenda adopted in the state following the
Brown decision.
In addition to the 11 states of the old Confederacy, there were 6 other "border" states along
with the District of Columbia that required segregated schools and 4 other states that permitted
localities to segregate their schools at the time of the Brown decision. These border states deseg-
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Why did white leaders in the moderate states of the upper South
respond to Brown with less outright defiance than their deep-South
brethren? The most obvious response is to suggest that the intensity
of opposition to racial integration varied among the southern states.1o
Yet those variations, although present to some extent, do not fully
account for the "moderation" of the upper South. Political leaders in
the more moderate states steadfastly opposed pupil mixing; what distinguished them from their more defiant colleagues was their appreciation of the costs of defiance and their willingness to balance other
concerns against their desire to prevent all pupil mixing.
First, politicians in the more moderate states understood that token integration, couched in the language of acceptance of the high
Court's mandate, could actually fend off more extensive judicially-imposed pupil mixing. This understanding was well-founded. On the
tenth anniversary of Brown, two of the most defiant states-Louisiana
and Virginia-had a higher percentage of black students attending integrated schools than did some of the moderate states11 due to adverse court decisions compelling desegregation.12 By the same token,
those moderate states such as North Carolina that adopted pupil assignment plans in response to the Brown decision seemed to accept
the inevitability of pupil mixing and subsequently engaged in voluntary token integration. These states thereby successfully avoided judicially compelled integration throughout the 1950s and retained almost
totally segregated school systems until the mid-1960s.13
regated their schools more quickly than did the states of the old Confederacy, although at least
in some instances, with an eye toward minimizing integration. MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE,
supra note 4, at 22-24; SoUTHERN EDuc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 26-28; Mary L.
Dudziak, The Limits of Good Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas, 1950-1956, 5 LAw & HIST.
REv. 351 (1987).
10 Most of the scholarship of the post-Brown era in the South has not emphasized the distinction between defiant states and moderate states, focusing instead on the various forms of massive resistance throughout the region. Most of these scholars note, however, that the intensity of
opposition to Brown did vary throughout the region, with the states of the deeper South (along
with Virginia) generally more defiant than the states of the upper South. See, e.g., BARTLEY,
supra note 4, at 16 n. 50; MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 16-37; WILHOIT, supra
note 4, at 27-40; WILKINSON, supra note 4.
11 On the tenth anniversary of the Brown decision, a higher percentage of black students
attended integrated schools in the defiant states of Louisiana (.6%) and Virginia (1.6%) than in
the moderate state of North Carolina (.5% ). SoUTHERN EDuc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7,
at 29.
12 Adkins v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.
La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
13 In North Carolina, for example, no litigation seeking the admission of black students into
white schools would be successful until the 1960s, notwithstanding the fact that the NAACP filed
more school desegregation lawsuits in North Carolina than in any other southern state during
the 1950s and the fact that in at least some of the school districts black students were required to
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Second, political leaders in the moderate states better understood
the economic costs of massive resistance than did their colleagues in
the defiant states. During the first decade following the Brown decision, many southern business leaders, keenly interested in attracting
new business to the region, feared that racial strife would have an adverse impact on economic development efforts.14 In the moderate
states, these business leaders effectively influenced governmental policy on school desegregation in the direction of voluntary token integration and away from statements defying the Supreme Court.
Hence, tokenism, clothed in the rhetoric of moderation, became an
effective tool in the moderate southern states to attract new business
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.15
Expressions of "moderation" in the post-Brown South thus did
not reflect an acceptance of racial desegregation. Rather, "moderation," at the level of both rhetoric and action, became the means by
which certain white southern leaders sought to avoid extensive pupil
mixing imposed by the courts and to facilitate economic growth. 16
attend school in another county because of the absence of any schools for black students within
their home county. See infra text accompanying notes 166-71.
14 A number of scholars have recently examined the degree of support among southern
white business leaders for desegregation efforts as a means of facilitating economic growth in
their region. Although these business leaders did not initiate desegregation efforts, in many
southern communities they did help facilitate desegregation and quicken its pace. The pressure
of the courts, the federal government, and black protest groups created an environment whereby
business leaders helped their communities embrace limited desegregation in the service of
broader community interests. See, e.g., DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY
CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1877-1980 (1985); ELIZABETH ]ACOWAY & DAVID R. COLBURN, SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION (1982) (containing essays on the roles of
business leaders in desegregation efforts in fourteen southern cities); RoBERT NoRRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MoVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE (1985).
15 Throughout this century, southern business leaders have sought to attract new capital to
the region as a means of fostering economic growth. See generally JAMES C. CoBB, THE SELLING
OF THE SoUTH: THE SOUTHERN CRUSADE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 1936-1980 (1982)
(describing efforts in the South to encourage industrial expansion in the region by attracting
outside capital). Southern states such as Virginia that engaged in resistance to the Brown decision experienced a decline in economic growth during the late 1950s whereas states such as
North Carolina that appeared to accept the realities of the Brown decision enjoyed substantial
economic growth during the same period. See infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
16 To be sure, the racial climate in the moderate southern states had traditionally been Jess
harsh than in the more defiant states. For example, in the moderate states, the disparities between the public financing of black and white schools had traditionally been smaller than in the
defiant states. See, e.g., HARRY S. AsHMORE, THE NEGRO AND THE ScHOOLS 159 (1954). Likewise, a higher percentage of black adults were registered to vote in the more moderate states.
See, e.g., STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SoUTH, 1944-1969
(1976); PAUL LUEBKE, TAR HEEL POLITICS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 114 (1990) (stating that
North Carolina had by far the highest percentage of black registered voters of any southern state
in 1960). Finally, with the exception of Texas, incidents of racial violence, particularly lynchings,
had typically been Jess frequent in some of the more moderate states. See, e.g., LUEBKE, supra,
at 102; George C. Rabie, The South and the Politics of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-1940, 51
J.S. HIST. 201 (1985).
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These leaders understood that appeals to "moderation," coupled with
token integration, could thwart most pupil mixing while preserving
important economic goalsP To be sure, these moderates strenuously
avoided overt defiance of judicial authority; within the constraints of
that authority, however, they carefully sought to keep school desegregation to a minimum.
This Article examines the way in which "moderation" functioned
during the first decade after Brown by focusing primarily on one of
the moderate southern states: North Carolina. The selection of North
Carolina as a state of primary emphasis is deliberate. On the eve of
the Brown decision, North Carolina enjoyed a public perception as
being the most racially moderate of all southern states.18 Likewise, in
the aftermath of Brown, North Carolina was perceived as assuming a
more moderate response to Brown-at the level of both political rhetoric and action-than any other southern state.19 Coupled with this
image as the most racially progressive of southern states, however,
was the reality that North Carolina engaged in virtually no pupil mixing during the first decade after Brown, even less than the defiant
states of Virginia and Louisiana.2 Contrary to the experience in some
of the defiant states, North Carolina's pupil assignment statute repeatedly passed judicial muster,21 thereby keeping the state's schools al-

°

17 See Dudziak, supra note 9 (providing a parallel discussion of the efforts of school board
members in a border state-Kansas-to limit pupil mixing).
18 See, e.g., CHARLES S. JoHNSON, INTo THE MAIN STREAM: A SuRVEY oF BEST PRAcncEs
IN RAcE RELATIONS IN THE SoUTH 31 (1947); V.O. KEY, JR., SoUTHERN PoLmcs IN STATE AND
NATION 206 (1949).
19 Several factors contributed to that perception. First, the North Carolina General Assembly's legislative response to Brown was less extreme than every other southern legislature and it
was one of only a few southern legislatures not to adopt an "interposition" resolution defying the
Brown decision. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In addition, North Carolina was the
only southern state not to adopt any legislation restricting the activities of the NAACP during
the 1950s. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. Moreover, at no point did a North
Carolina governor urge defiance of the Supreme Court, unlike the governors of many other
southern states. North Carolina's governors argued instead for minimizing the impact of the
Brown decision through lawful means, couched in the language of "moderation."
Furthermore, three North Carolina cities-Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salemwere among the first in the South to desegregate their schools without court order in September
1957. The relatively peaceful desegregation in these school systems stood in sharp contrast with
the simultaneous and far more tumultuous desegregation in Little Rock and helped North Carolina capture nationwide and even worldwide attention as a southern state that had taken a different course in race relations. See infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text. Finally, in 1961, one
North Carolina school system became the first in the South to convert to a pupil assignment plan
based completely on geography rather than on race. See infra note 191.
20 By the tenth anniversary of Brown, only .5% of the state's black population attended
school with white children. SoUTHERN Eouc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 29. In over
75% of the state's school districts, no black child attended a desegregated school. 11 of the 16
southern and border states had a higher percentage of black students in white schools than did
North Carolina in 1964. Id.
21 See infra note 188.
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most completely segregated for ten years and vindicating the hopes of
those "moderates" who argued that token integration would fend off
more intrusive judicial measures. At the same time, utilizing its reputation for moderation in racial matters, North Carolina enjoyed vibrant economic growth during the late 1950s and early 1960s, in
contrast to some other southern states that engaged in well-publicized
acts of defiance.
This Article concludes that the concept of "moderation" in the
post-Brown South, particularly in North Carolina, was a malleable
concept, skillfully used to deflect widespread pupil integration.
Resistance to Brown was far more spectacular in the defiant southern
states such as Virginia and Louisiana, but equally effective in states
such as North Carolina that understood the value of tokenism and
appeals to moderation.22
II.

THE SouTH's REsPONSE TO

BnowN

The initial reaction to the Brown decision varied throughout the
South. Some southern leaders immediately spoke the language of defiance. Senator James Eastland of Mississippi announced that "the
Supreme Court of the United States in the false name of law and justice has perpetrated a monstrous crime. " 23 Mississippi Governor
Hugh L. White stated that "we're not going to pay any attention to the
Supreme Court's decision. We don't think it will have any effect on us
down here at all. " 24 In fact, no black child would attend school with a
white child in Mississippi for over a decade. Other states, such as
Georgia and South Carolina, had already taken action in anticipation
of the Supreme Court's decision by abolishing the constitutional requirement of public education.25
Yet in much of the South, even in states that would eventually
engage in massive resistance, the voice of defiance, at least initially,
22 The use of tokenism to deflect challenges of exclusion extends well beyond the school
desegregation context of the 1950s. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QuEST FOR RAciAL JuSTicE 140-61 (1987).
23 DAVID R. GoLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SoUTHERN: RAcE RELATIONS AND SoUTHERN CULTURE 1940 TO THE PRESENT 75 (1990).
24 SARRATT, supra note 4, at 1.
25 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 21; BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 54. South
Carolina Governor James Byrnes announced the following before the Court released its decision: "If the Court changes what is now the law of the land, we will, if it is possible, live within
the law, preserve the public-school system, and at the same time maintain segregation. If that is
not possible, reluctantly we will abandon the public-school system." MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 22. After the Court rendered its decision, Georgia Governor Herman
Talmadge announced: "[t]here will never be mixed schools while I am governor.... The United
States Supreme Court by its decision today has reduced our Constitution to a mere scrap of
paper." Constitution Ruined, Says Georgia Governor, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 18,
1954, at 1.
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was not heard. Louisiana Senator Russell Long announced that
"although I completely disagree with the decision, my oath of office
requires me to accept it as the law."26 In Virginia, the state that would
ultimately devise and lead the South's strategy of massive resistance,
Attorney General Lindsay Almond, Jr. claimed that "Virginia will approach the question realistically and endeavor to work out some rational adjustment." Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley promised to
"work toward a plan which will be acceptable to our citizens and in
keeping with the edict of the court."27 In Arkansas, which would be
home to one of the most celebrated instances of defiance in 1957 with
the integration of Little Rock's Central High School, Governor Francis Cherry announced that "Arkansas will obey the law. It always
has." 28 Likewise, in Alabama, first Governor Gordon Persons and
then Governor Jim Folsom responded to Brown without defiance, refusing initially to enact any special legislation in response to the decision and then adopting a pupil placement statute modeled after North
Carolina's, which on its face appeared racially neutral.2 9
In time, however, much of the South hardened in its resolve to
oppose the Brown decision. Such resistance was fueled by the understanding that a firm stance on segregation was politically popular
among white voters. Within three months, the Louisiana legislature
censured the Supreme Court for its "usurping of power."30 Virginia's
Governor Stanley announced in June 1954 his desire to "use every
legal means at my command to continue segregated schools. "31 By
November 1954, several southern states had enacted legislation to
forestall implementation of Brown. For example, Louisiana enacted a
statute requiring the continuation of segregated schools;32 Georgia
made it a felony for any public official to spend money on an integrated school;33 and Mississippi allowed local school districts to close
public schools in the face of desegregation initiatives34 and ultimately
made it unlawful for a white person to attend an integrated school.35
26

MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 20.

27 Id. at 21. Stanley also commented that his state would find a way to satisfy the Court.

CHARLES P. RoLAND, THE IMPROBABLE ERA: THE SoUTH SINCE WoRLD WAR II 35 (1975).
28 WILHOIT, supra note 4, at 31.
29 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 61-62; WILHOIT, supra note 4, at 32-34.
Many regarded Alabama, at least initially, as a moderate southern state. But in time, Alabama
would adopt a posture of resistance. Indeed, no black child would attend school with a white
child in Alabama until1962. SOUTHERN EDuc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 27.
30 Louisiana, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 13.
31 Virginia, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 13.
32 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 74; Public Schools-Louisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 239
(1956) (discussing Act 555 of 1954).
33 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 75.
34 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 24.
35 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 76-77.
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Following the Supreme Court's second Brown decision in May
1955,36 segregationist feeling in much of the South noticeably increased. During the first three months of 1956, the legislatures of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia enacted a
total of forty-two prosegregation statutes.37 Likewise, Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia all
adopted resolutions of interposition declaring the Brown decision null
and void and interposing the authority of the state between the high
Court and the people of the state. Eventually, eight southern states
drafted some type of interposition measure.38
Even those "moderate" southern political leaders who initially
refused to speak in defiance of the Court did not embrace pupil mixing. Florida's Governor LeRoy Collins, who won the title of "the
moderate Southern Governor" during the mid-1950s, claimed that
"we can preserve segregation" and sponsored a number of bills in the
Florida General Assembly that, while moderate in comparison to
those in other state legislatures, sought to do just that.39 Indeed, no
black child in Florida would attend an integrated school until1959. 40
III.

NORTH CAROLINA'S "MODERATE" RESPONSE TO BROWN

As most of the South began to articulate its policy of massive
resistance, the more moderate states of the upper South, particularly
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, avoided outright statements of
defiance. North Carolina in particular measured its response to the
unwelcome Brown decision against larger state goals: the desire to
preserve a vibrant economic base and the desire to avoid judicial intervention in the operation of the schools. In so doing, the state continued certain traditions established during the pre-Brown era.

A.

North Carolina During the Pre-Brown Era

Throughout the pre-Brown era, North Carolina was regarded as
the region's most racially moderate state, particularly in matters of
education.41 The state's political leaders, although strong proponents
of racial segregation, had supported black education during the half
century prior to Brown at levels exceeding that of most other southern
36 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
37 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra note 6 for examples of a
few of these statutes.
38 See supra note 5; BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 131; MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra
note 4, at 71-72.
39 MusE, TEN YEARS oF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 60.
40 SOUTHERN EDUC. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 27.
41 KEY, supra note 18, at 206; JoHNSON, supra note 18, at 31.
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states.42 Moreover, the North Carolina General Assembly took additional action during the late 1930s and 1940s that significantly improved the status of black education. However, in so acting, the
General Assembly was clearly motivated by the desire to .undermine
NAACP-sponsored litigation that threatened federal court intervention in the operation of North Caroliha's education system.
In 1939, the North Carolina General Assembly established some
of the South's first state-supported graduate and professional programs for black students in response to the United States Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in Missouri ex ref. Gaines v. Canada.43 In
Gaines, the Court ordered the state of Missouri either to admit a black
student to the state's white law school or make some other provision
for his education. Since no southern state, including North Carolina,
provided any such educational opportunities for black students, all
were vulnerable to similar legal challenges and the General Assembly
acted to avert litigation forcing the integration of its graduate
schools.44
Successful litigation in other jurisdictions also prompted the
North Carolina General Assembly to take action with regard to unequal teacher salaries. In 1940, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held in a Virginia case that teacher salary disparities violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend42 A 1927 NAACP study of southern school financing concluded that disparities in terms of
expenditures, average class size, and average teacher salaries between black and white schools
were smaller in North Carolina than in any other southern state. The Negro Common School in
North Carolina, 34 THE CRISIS 79 (May 1927); The Negro Common School in North Carolina, 34
THE CRISIS 117 (June 1927); MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 5-6 (1987). In 1929, Oswald Garrison Villard made a
similar claim in a Harper's article. Oswald Villard, The Crumbling Color Line, HARPER's MAG.,
July 1929, at 156. This relatively strong support for black education would continue throughout
the pre-Brown period. In 1935-36, for example, according to the United States Office of Education, average expenditures for white children in North Carolina were more than twice that of
black children, but that gap was the smallest of any of the seven states examined in the South.
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, BACKGROUND TO PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 14 (1943). Also in
1937-38, white teacher salaries in North Carolina were about 45% higher than black teacher
salaries, according to the United States Office of Education-again the smallest gap of any of
the nine southern states examined. Id. at 16.
43 305 u.s. 337 (1938).
44 Epps v. Carmichael, 93 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.N.C. 1950) (discussing actions of North Carolina General Assembly); Augustus Burns, North Carolina and the Negro Dilemma, 1930-1950, at
131 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). The
quick action of the General Assembly in response to the Gaines decision reflected a calculated
desire to prevent judicially-compelled integration of North Carolina's white colleges and universities. Indeed, shortly after the Gaines decision, Pauli Murray, a black woman and later distinguished lawyer and poet, sought admission to the University of North Carolina Law School.
MoRTON SosNA, IN SEARCH OF THE SILENT SoUTH: SoUTHERN LIBERALS AND THE RACE IssuE
85-86 (1977). Even though Murray decided not to challenge her exclusion in the courts, the lack
of a law school for black students had left the state vulnerable in light of the Gaines decision.
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ment. 45 The decision enjoyed wide publicity and the NAACP
subsequently won similar victories in other states throughout the
South.46 Cognizant of the potential for similar litigation in North Carolina, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction persuaded the
General Assembly to increase the pay of black teachers. 47 As a result,
throughout the 1940s, the North Carolina General Assembly appropriated increasingly larger sums of money to provide for the ultimate
equalization of black and white teacher salaries.48 By 1945, black
teachers in North Carolina were actually earning more than white
teachers because of their higher qualifications, despite the fact no litigation challenging unequal teacher salaries had ever been filed in the
state.49
Finally, litigation filed by the NAACP in the late 1940s challenging the unequal expenditures for black and white schools in North
Carolina50 and threats by the organization to seek the admission of
45 Alston v. School Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940). See generally Bruce Beezer, Black
Teachers' Salaries and the Federal CourtS Before Brown v. Board of Education: One Beginning
for Equity, 55 J. NEGRO Eouc. 200 (1986); TusHNET, supra note 42, at 58-65, 78-80, 90-92, 95103.
46 Black teachers eventually won equalization suits in six southern states-Virginia, Florida,
Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. JoHNSON, supra note 18, at 137; JoHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 536-37 (1947).
47 Nathan C. Newbold, Some Achievements in the Equalization of Educational Opportunities
in North Carolina, 9 Eouc. F. 451 (1945).
48 Id.
49 NoRTH CAROLINA ADVISORY CoMM. TO THE U.S. CoMM'N oN CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN NORTH CAROLINA 102 (1962). Just six years earlier, in 1939, white
teachers in North Carolina had earned 38% more than black teachers. AsHMORE, supra note 16,
at 159; PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH TODAY AND TOMORROW: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 59
(Ernst W. Swanson & John A. Griffin eds., 1955).
Prior to the successful salary equalization litigation in other states, there had been a serious
but unsuccessful effort in North Carolina to equalize teacher salaries. In 1934 and 1935, a biracial Commission for the Study of Problems in Negro Education appointed by Governor John
C.B. Ehringhaus had revealed significant disparities between black and white teacher salaries
and recommended that those disparities be completely eliminated within three to five years.
Report of Governor's Commission for the Study of Problems in the Education of Negroes in
North Carolina 96 (1935) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Collection,
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)); Governor's Commission for the Study of Problems
in the Education of Negroes in North Carolina: Summarized Reports of Subcommittees and
Recommendations (1934) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Collection,
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). The North Carolina General Assembly, however,
ignored the Commission's recommendations. Absent any judicial precedent compelling such
salary equalization, the Commission's recommendations carried little weight.
50 In the late 1940s, the national NAACP's litigation strategy expanded to include challenges
to unequal elementary and secondary school facilities. In several North Carolina cities, local
NAACP branches threatened litigation if conditions in black schools did not improve. RALEIGH
NEws & OBSERVER, June 12, 1946; Burns, supra note 44, at 88-89. Although most local
branches of the organization ultimately declined to initiate litigation, a few lawsuits were filed.
In 1951, a federal court found that black schools in Durham were indeed unconstitutionally
underfunded. Blue v. Durham Pub. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 441 (M.D.N.C. 1951). Other suits
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black students into white schools if these inequalities persisted5 1 induced the North Carolina General Assembly to appropriate increasingly larger sums of money for black schools. This increase in
appropriations had tangible results. Whereas in 1940 the state spent
seventy-one percent more per white pupil than per black pupil, by
1952 the difference was seventeen percent-the lowest in the South.52
But North Carolina's support for black education during the preBrown era did not translate into support for integrated schools. Putting small children of different races together in a classroom ran afoul
of southern social mores in a way that equalizing school expenditures
or teacher salaries did not. To challenge public school segregation was
to challenge a foundation stone of southern culture that divided even
those of liberal sensibilities. In 1949, for example, the progressive
North Carolina Commission on Interracial Cooperation dissolved after nearly three decades due to internal disagreements over the wisdom of racial integration.53 Similarly, in June 1950, Willis Smith
defeated Frank Porter Graham in a bitterly contested Democratic
runoff primary for the United States Senate in which Smith's allies
charged that if Graham was elected, pupil mixing would follow.
were filed chaiienging unequal support for black schools in Wilson, High Point, Washington
County, Old Fort, Lumberton, and Gaston County. Winborne v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 649 (4th Cir.
1952); Joyner v. McDoweii County Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1956); GREENSBORO
DAILY NEws, Apr. 12, 1950; RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 16, 1950; Bums, supra note 44,
at 100-01; Letter from Donald Ramseur to Keily Alexander (Feb. 3, 1955) (on file with the Keily
Miiier Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte).
51 North Carolina State NAACP President Keily Alexander, for example, in his 1949 address
to the state NAACP convention, cailed for "a county by county campaign" to fight segregated
education in North Carolina: "This fight should include court action on the elementary, secondary and university level. The goal is an integrated school system." Keiiy Alexander, Address to
Annual North Carolina Conference of NAACP Branches 6 (June 23, 1949) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Keiiy Miiler Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North
Carolina at Charlotte). For the next several years, Alexander would repeat that call in his annual presidential address. See Keiiy Alexander, Address to Annual North Carolina Conference
of NAACP Branches 6 (June 1, 1950} (same); Keily Alexander, Address to Annual North Carolina Conference of NAACP Branches 5 (Oct. 17, 1952) (same).
52 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A., PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SoUTHERN STATES, 1962, at 64 n.2 (1962); North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10.
Between 1940 and 1952, per pupil expenditures on black students in North Carolina increased
462% while per pupil expenditures on white students increased 285%. UNITED STATES CoMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra.
53 Throughout its tenure, this biracial organization of distinguished North Carolina educators
and church leaders confronted an array of racial issues; integration proved to be its death kneii.
See generally Elizabeth Earnhardt, Critical Years: The North Carolina Commission on Interracial Cooperation, 1942-1949 (1971) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina
(Chapel Hiii}) (describing the final years of the Commission and the effects of integrationist
efforts).
Even Frank Porter Graham, perhaps the South's leading racial liberal, held the line against
racial integration during his tenure as president of the University of North Carolina during the
1930s and 1940s. SosNA, supra note 44, at 85-86.
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Smith's racial charges undoubtedly influenced the election.54 Thus,
although North Carolina adjusted more easily to changing racial demands than did other southern states during the pre-Brown era, the
state shared the region's deep aversion to the racial mixing that
Brown seemed to demand.

B. North Carolina's Initial Response to Brown
Political leaders in North Carolina initially responded to the
Brown decision in subdued tones. Most of the state's politicians, reflecting the sentiment of the state's white population, opposed school
integration. But most were also unprepared to engage in hopeless defiance of the high Court that could hurt the state's broader interests.
Hence, for the next several years, the state's political leaders sought to
avoid as much integration as possible while taking no action that
would undermine the state's education system or reputation for moderation on matters of race. Effectively utilizing limited token integration, North Carolina's leaders would pursue a course of wellpublicized "moderation" in contrast to its more obstreperous southern
neighbors.
Upon learning of the Brown decision, North Carolina Governor
William Umstead, although noting that he was "terribly disappointed"
by the decision,55 refused to counsel defiance of the high Court, stating instead that the "Supreme Court of the United States has spoken"56 and that "[t]his is no time for rash statements or the proposal
of impossible schemes."57 Two days later, Irving Carlyle, a prominent
North Carolina attorney and Democratic leader, addressed the North
Carolina Democratic Convention and urged the state to obey the decision: "as good citizens we have no other course except to obey the
54 JULIAN M. PLEASANTS & AUGUSTUS M. BURNS Ill, FRANK PORTER GRAHAM AND THE
1950 SENATE RACE IN NORTH CAROLINA 194-99, 215 (1990); MICHAEL MYERSON, NOTHING
CouLD BE FINER 33 (1978). One pro-Smith handbill asked voters if they wanted "Negroes
going to white schools and white children going to Negro schools." ld.
55 Umstead 'Terribly Disappointed' Man, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, May 18, 1954, at 1;
North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10.
56 WILLIAM UMSTEAD, PUBLIC ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF WILLIAM BRADLEY UMSTEAD,
GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1953-1954, at 201 (David Corbitt ed., 1957).
57 William B. Umstead, A Statement by Governor William B. Umstead 2 (May 27, 1954)
(unpublished transcript, on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State
Archives, Raleigh, N.C.). Governor Umstead did announce that in light of the Supreme Court's
decision to postpone consideration of the remedy issue the state's schools would continue to
operate on a segregated basis. North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10.
However, the day after the decision was announced, the Greensboro (N.C.) School Board
became one of the first in the United States to resolve to study ways of complying with the
decision; the Board chair announced that "we must not fight or attempt to circumvent this decision." North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10.
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law laid down by the United States Supreme Court."58 The convention adopted a resolution affirming "the supremacy of the law for all
citizens."59 The resolution was not an endorsement of Brown, but it
did reflect the fact that much of the political leadership of North Carolina did not care to flout the Supreme Court's authority.60
Within weeks of the Brown decision, Governor Umstead, in his
first significant response to the decision, directed the North Carolina
Institute of Government, a branch of the University of North Carolina, to prepare a report analyzing Brown and outlining possible responses to the decision. The selection of the Institute to prepare the
state's initial analysis of Brown was significant. The Institute, under
the leadership of Director Albert Coates, had since the 1930s offered
the state an impressive array of critical analyses of public policy
issues.61
Governor Umstead met with Coates and his assistant, James
Paul, to discuss their work. He articulated his fear that a demagogue
might exploit the school desegregation issue for political advantage in
North Carolina and thus do serious damage to the state and its reputation. Umstead reminded Coates and Paul that the 1950 Democratic
primary between Graham and Smith62 had unleashed a great deal of
58 WILLIAM CHAFE, C!VILmES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA AND
THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 65-66 (1980). Some have suggested that his candor cost
Carlyle appointment to the vacant U.S. Senate seat. John Batchelor, Save Our Schools: Dallas
Herring and the Governor's Special Advisory Committee on Education 24 (1983) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Greensboro).
59 CHAFE, supra note 58, at 66.
60 Just as the state's politicians were addressing the question of school desegregation, so were
the state's religious institutions. Imbued with considerable moral authority in a deeply religious
region, the various religious groups within the state divided on the issue. This division reflected
the conflict between decades of segregationist traditions and a moral disquiet with racial separation. The Western North Carolina Conference of the Methodist Church met in the fall of 1954
and considered a very mild resolution that would have expressed "sympathy" for public school
administrators sorting out desegregation problems and would have recognized "the obligation of
all citizens to obey the law of the land" and that the issue must be resolved "in the light of the
teachings of Jesus Christ." North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Nov. 4, 1954, at 13. The resolution
failed; the Conference instead resolved much more weakly to ask its various constituent institutions to "study" the issue. Id. The Southern Presbyterian Journal, a semi-official organ of the
southern Presbyterian Church, a leading denomination in the state, deplored the destruction of
"racial integrity as it has developed in the province of God" and contended that school segregation "is not unChristian." N.C. Courts Block Efforts to Prevent Desegregation, S. ScH. NEws,
Sept. 1957, at 15. The General Assembly of the denomination, however, opposed school
segregation.
On the other hand, the Episcopal Diocese of North Carolina in June 1954 adopted a resolution asking Episcopalians to "work toward an orderly transition to an integrated public school
system." North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. Th~ Catholic bishop in North Carolina required the immediate desegregation of Catholic high schools in the state following the first
Brown decision. North Carolina, S. SCH. NEws, Oct. 1, 1954, at 11.
61 See generally ALBERT COATES, THE STORY OF THE INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT (1960).
62 See supra text accompanying note 54.
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racial bitterness, which had caused the state great harm. The Governor feared that the Brown decision, if mishandled, could cause similar
problems.63
Within three months, the Institute submitted a lengthy and detailed analysis of the Court's decision and the various legal responses
available to the state.64 The report, written in large measure by Paul,
who had recently finished a clerkship with United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice Fred Vinson, was one of the most balanced and
dispassionate analyses of the Brown decision prepared during the
1950s. This achievement was all the more remarkable in light of the
rancor of much of the contemporaneous discussion of the decision
throughout the South.
The Institute report analyzed several of the proposed responses
to Brown that were gaining favor in other southern states, such as the
creation of a state-supported private school system and the utilization
of private school tuition grants. The report concluded that the constitutionality of such proposals was doubtful65 and that, in order for the
state to avert judicial challenge to its pupil assignment scheme, some
black students must receive assignments to white schools. 66 Although
the report did not make explicit recommendations, it suggested that
the state refrain from openly defying the Supreme Court because such
action would result in "litigious harassment, damage suits, and possibly considerable court supervision." The authors instead encouraged
a program of gradual desegregation that would allow "a minimum of
court interference and a minimum of sudden change." 67 The Institute
report clearly contemplated some desegregation, in marked contrast
to the declarations of several other southern states, although it recognized that such desegregation efforts would take time given the political realities of the mid-1950s.6s

63 Telephone Interview with James Paul, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School (Feb. 24,
1993).
64 JAMES PAUL & ALBERT COATES, THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION DECISION (1954).
65 The Institute report relied on an earlier Fourth Circuit decision, Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free
Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), which dealt with the constitutionality of racially based
exclusions from publicly supported institutions. The Kerr decision made it likely that public
support for racially restrictive private schools would be found unconstitutional.
66 PAUL & CoATES, supra note 64, at 90-92. That conclusion was a reasonable reading of
Brown, but it overestimated the willingness of the federal courts in the near future to scrutinize
closely the actions of southern school boards.
67 Id. at 118.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 30-38. Paul's brief tour in the South would end when
he returned to his native Pennsylvania and joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School in 1955.
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C.

The Pearsall Committee

In August 1954, having received the Institute report, Governor
Umstead appointed a nineteen-person committee-including three
black members-under the leadership of former Speaker of the
House Thomas J. Pearsall to study the desegregation issue. Umstead
presented the Pearsall Committee with copies of the Institute's report
and emphasized the report's gradual approach.69 Pearsall announced
at the outset that his primary goal was to preserve the public schools,
an obvious reference to the discussion in many southern states about
abandoning the public school system.7°
Throughout the fall, as the Committee did its work, Umstead
continued to resist pressure from segregationists to publicly defy the
Supreme Court. In September 1954, for example, Umstead refused to
endorse a petition from a large number of his constituents favoring
the continuation of school segregation.71 When other southern politicians joined the call for defiance, Umstead resisted such action and
sought to defuse any racial demagoguery that could harm the state.72
69 Batchelor, supra note 58, at 32. Umstead also presented the Committee members with a
copy of Harry Ashmore's The Negro and the Schools, a 1954 Ford Foundation study of desegregation which detailed the broad discrepancies between black and white education in America.
ASHMORE, supra note 16, at 33-34. Having examined previous desegregation efforts outside of
the South, the Ashmore study concluded that "it is axiomatic that separate schools can be
merged only with great difficulty, if at all, when a great majority of the citizens who support
them are opposed to the move." I d. at 81-82. That aspect of the Ashmore study would be used
by desegregation opponents to legitimate a lack of integration in the face of community
opposition.
70 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10.
71 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Oct. 1, 1954, at 11.
72 Although North Carolina's leaders publicly eschewed defiance, they did seek to persuade
the United States Supreme Court to reject school desegregation in the rehearing on the Brown
case. In the fall of 1954, the state's Attorney General submitted a brief to the Court on the
remedy question in the Brown case which argued that desegregation was simply not feasible in
North Carolina. The brief, drafted in large measure by segregationist Beverly Lake, an Assistant
Attorney General, concluded that desegregation would cause substantial disruption and even
violence in North Carolina's schools based on a survey of the opinions of law enforcement officers and school superintendents. Brief of Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae, in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 983-85 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975). Any attempt to desegregate the schools, Lake argued, could lead to the abandonment of
public education. In a statement that betrayed a profound misunderstanding of the direction
that school desegregation law would take, Lake concluded that in the state's cities with significant residential segregation, the Brown decision would have little impact. He worried instead
about rural North Carolina where blacks and whites lived in desegregated residential patterns
and where a race-neutral pupil assignment plan would result in extensive desegregation. Brief of
Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae, supra, at 985; North
Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Dec. 1, 1954, at 11. Ironically, Lake had initially opposed appearing in
the Brown case, fearing that the state's appearance would give the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over North Carolina schools. Letter from James Paul to author (Sept. 20, 1993) (on file with
Northwestern University Law Review).
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The Pearsall Committee completed its report four months later
on December 30,1954. Governor Umstead had died on November 7,
so the Committee submitted its report to his successor, Governor Luther Hodges, a former textile executive who had entered politics in
1952 with his election as Lieutenant Governor. Hodges perceived
himself as a businessman first and foremost; indeed, he entitled his
autobiography, published a few years after his tenure as Governor,
Businessman in the Statehouse.73 Throughout his six years as Governor, Hodges was an aggressive proponent of economic development;
one of his lasting legacies was the creation of Research Triangle Park
west of Raleigh for the purpose of promoting corporate and government research.74 Hodges's concern for the way in which his policy
decisions affected business animated his administration, including his
treatment of the desegregation issue.
At first blush, the Pearsall Committee's report seemed to dash
any hope that the state might move toward substantial desegregation,
gradual or otherwise. The Committee, including the three black members, unanimously concluded that "the mixing of the races forthwith in
the public schools throughout the State can not be accomplished and
should not be attempted" because it "would alienate public support of
the schools to such an extent that they could not be operated successfully."75 Although the use of the word "forthwith" introduced a degree of ambiguity into the Committee's conclusions, leaving open the
question whether the Committee contemplated the eventual desegregation of the schools, the report expressed strong opposition to school
desegregation.
On the other hand, the report avoided recommending any legislative action such as school closings or the use of private school tuition
grants, which were gaining popularity in other southern states and
which might undermine the public schools. Indeed, the only legislative action that the Committee recommended was the transfer of authority over pupil assignments from the state to local school boards.76
That the state would take such a strong position in its Brown brief was not surprising. The
Governor and the Attorney General had studiously avoided counseling defiance of the Supreme
Court, but they were quite anxious to avoid pupil mixing by any lawful means available.
73 LUTHER HoDGES, BUSINESSMAN IN THE STATEHOUSE: SIX YEARS AS GOVERNOR OF
NORTH CAROLINA

(1962).

&

WALTER DEVRIES, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 229-30
(1976).
75 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Feb. 3, 1955, at 14. Although the Committee recommendation was unanimous, there was some dissent. One white member, Dallas Herring, did not want
to join the report, but did so under pressure to make the report unanimous. Batchelor, supra
note 58, at 100-01.
76 On the widely discussed school closing question, the Committee recommended that the
public school system be preserved, although it did note that "abandoning or materially altering"
the public school system might eventually be necessary. North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Feb. 3,
1955, at 14.
74 JACK BASS
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The report thus set the state on a course that it would follow for the
next several years: avoid the strident responses to Brown, which
might damage the state's moderate reputation, but minimize as much
as possible the amount of school desegregation.77
When the North Carolina General Assembly convened its regular
legislative session in January 1955, one of the legislature's primary
items of business was consideration of the Pearsall Committee's report. Governor Hodges endorsed the report as an appropriate and
"moderate" response to the crisis brought about by the Brown decision. Hodges, echoing the concern of his predecessor Umstead, announced that the recommendations outlined in the report "protect
what we think are our rights without any demagoguery."78 On March
30, 1955, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation
that vested local school boards with exclusive authority over pupil assignments.79 The statute expressly directed local school boards not to
consider race as an assignment criteria.80 Assistant Attorney General
Beverly Lake informed the Supreme Court in oral argument in April
77 The support of the Committee's three black members, although troubling to many in the
black community, particularly the NAACP, was not surprising. Each of the three was employed
by the state and hence disinclined to dissent from the majority view. Moreover, two of the three
black members were heads of all-black. state colleges that had benefitted from the legacy of
segregated education in the state.
The NAACP issued a statement claiming that the three "were not free to express their
personal opinion" and did not reflect "the majority opinion of fellow Negroes of North Carolina." Kelly Alexander, Implementation of .the United States Supreme Court Decision of May
17, 1954 in North Carolina 11 (1954) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Kelly Miller
Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). Yet the latter
claim was open to question. An American Institute of Public Opinion Survey found in February
1956 that only 53% of southern blacks polled supported the Brown decision-in large measure
because of fear of mistreatment of black children in white schools. Richard Lamanna, The Negro Public School Teacher and School Desegregation: A Survey of Negro Teachers in North
Carolina 54 (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)).
Although the support of southern blacks for school desegregation would dramatically increase
over the course of the next few years, during the first few years after Brown, the NAACP's
integrationist agenda was not shared by all members of the black community.
78 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Feb. 3, 1955, at 14.
79 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955). The statute gave local school boards "full and complete" authority to enroll school children and provided that the school board's "decision as to
the enrollment of any pupil in any such school shall be final." Id. In making these decisions,
school boards were directed to consider "the orderly and efficient administration" of the schools,
"the effective instruction of the pupils," and the "health, safety, and general welfare of such
pupils." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-177 (1955).
Although many southern states chose to wait for the Supreme Court's remedial decision in
the Brown case before taking legislative action, the North Carolina state legislature, pursuant to
the recommendations of the Institute of Government, preferred to go ahead and grant local
school boards discretion in making pupil assignments to avoid the possibility of one lawsuit desegregating all of the state's schools.
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955).
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1955 during the second Brown case that the statute would permit a
local school board to operate mixed-race schools.81
Although the new legislation appeared racially neutral and hence
moderate in comparison to the legislative enactments in several other
southern states, in fact it contained certain features that inhibited
widespread desegregation. First, the legislation decentralized assignment authority making it impossible to challenge pupil assignments
without bringing suit against each individual school board. Second,
the legislation established a complicated system of administrative appeals through which challenges to school board assignments had to be
made and transfer requests filed. No black student could legally challenge an assignment to a segregated school unless that student had
faithfully adhered to all specified administrative procedures. Many
black children would lose their opportunity to challenge a school assignment because they failed to comply with some detail of the administrative appeal process. Thus, while on its face the legislation
appeared to constitute an abandonment of previous race-based pupil
assignments, in practice every school board in the state would continue to assign students to school on the basis of race until the early
1960s.82 At the same time, most school boards would deny all requests filed by black students to transfer to a white school.83
Yet the actions of the North Carolina General Assembly were
perceived as moderate and enlightened when compared to that of
most other southern states. Unlike some other southern state legislatures, North Carolina's General Assembly had resisted efforts to enact
a constitutional amendment abolishing the requirement of public
schools and providing tuition grants to parents who wished to place
their children in private schools. In addition, the Assembly had rejected legislation providing that any school district which permitted
desegregation be denied state funds. 84 Governor Hodges, concerned
about the negative impact these proposals would have on the state's
relatively strong public school system and hence economic climate, labeled them "extreme and untimely." 85 Hodges ultimately persuaded
the legislators who sponsored these bills to withdraw them pending
81 Oral Argument, Brown v. Board of Educ. (Apr. 13, 1955), in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 72, at 1227.
82 See infra note 188.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
84 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 3, 1955, at 13; North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Apr. 7,
1955, at 12. Other states would take a different course. Louisiana and South Carolina, for example, enacted legislation in 1954 and 1955, respectively, requiring a fund cutoff for schools that
desegregated. Education: Public Schools-Louisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956); Education: Public Schools-South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 241 (1956).
85 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 3, 1955, at 13. North Carolina had long recognized
the relationship between a strong public school system, an educated workforce, and economic
progress. In 1950, for example, North Carolina ranked fifth in the nation in percentage of in-
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the Supreme Court's upcoming remedial decision in the Brown case.86
Hodges understood that delegation of assignment authority to local
school boards would achieve the same results as the proposed constitutional amendment, but without the rancor and damage to the public
schools that would accompany outright defiance. Recognizing the
broader economic interests at stake, the Governor sought to avoid
harm to the state that would ensue should the General Assembly
abolish the constitutional requirement of a public education system.

D.

The Second Pearsall Committee

Yet one year later, in 1956, the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted a more ambitious legislative program aimed at reducing the
threat of school desegregation and which appeared at first blush to
embrace certain of the more extreme positions taken in other states.
In the spring of 1955, the North Carolina General Assembly had created a second education commission, also known as the Pearsall Committee, to make further study of the desegregation question. 87 In
April1956, this second Pearsall Committee, working in close consultation with Hodges, issued its report, which explicitly expressed a desire
to maintain segregated schools:8 8
The educational system of North Carolina has been built on the
foundation stone of segregation of the races in the schools. . . . The
come spent on public education. North Carolina: The Integration Issue, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 1956.
86 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Apr. 7, 1955, at 12. Hodges later commented that:
"[a]bolition of the public schools ... is a last-ditch and double-edged weapon. If that weapon is
ever used in North Carolina, its result will be appalling in ignorance, poverty, and bitterness."
Luther Hodges, Address on State-Wide Radio-Television Network, (Aug. 8, 1955) in 1
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF LUTHER HODGES, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1954-1961, at 210 (James W. Patton ed., 1960).
The pragmatism of the North Carolina General Assembly was perhaps best manifest in one
final piece of legislation enacted in 1955: a statute providing for the termination of all teacher
contracts at year end, subject to renewal on a one-year basis. Attorney General Harry McMullan promoted that legislation, arguing that the courts were likely to disallow the current dual
school system and that some teachers would lose their jobs if black and white schools were
merged. North Carolina, S. SCH. NEws, June 8, 1955, at 13. By terminating teacher contracts,
the state could avoid contractual liability for teacher layoffs should a court order a school system
to consolidate its schools. Moreover, the Supreme Court had still not announced its remedial
decision in Brown, and many feared that the Court might order immediate desegregation. The
statute reflected a legislature prepared to adapt itself to the realities of desegregation, not one
prepared to avoid desegregation at all costs.
87 Governor Hodges appointed seven white men to the new Committee, later explaining that
black members would have been under too much pressure from outside groups to push for immediate desegregation. HoDGES, supra note 73, at 83.
88 In December 1955, the Advisory Committee notified Hodges, in advance of the release of
its report, that its proposal would maintain support for the public schools but deflect as much
integration as possible. N.C. is Told 1955 'Assignment' Statute Provides Best Defense, S. ScH.
NEws, Feb. 1956, at 12.
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Supreme Court of the United States destroyed the school system which
we had developed-a segregated-by-law system.... [The Committee is]
proposing the building of a new school system on a new foundation-a
foundation of no racial segregation by law, but assignment according to
natural racial preference and the administrative determination of what is
best for the child.89

In a reversal from the prior year, the Committee's "Pearsall Plan"
provided for constitutional amendments allowing both private school
tuition grants for parents whose children were assigned to a desegregated school and local referenda whereby a community could decide
whether to close its schools instead of desegregating them. 90 Both the
Governor and the General Assembly had rejected school closing legislation a year earlier, but now the Pearsall Plan gave local communities
the option of taking that course of action.
Governor Hodges publicly embraced the Pearsall Plan with its
more extreme provisions.91 It was a clear reversal for the Governor.
One year earlier, Hodges had successfully led an effort to defeat
school closing legislation. 92 Now, Hodges supported a constitutional
amendment permitting the closure of the public schools. When
Hodges went before the General Assembly during the summer of
1956 to defend the Pearsall Plan, he offered a much more aggressive
defense of racial segregation than he had in 1955: "It is my firm belief
that ... the people of North Carolina expect their General Assembly
and their governor to do everything legally possible to prevent their
children from being forced to attend mixed schools against their
wishes. " 93
The General Assembly ratified the Pearsall Plan following a special four-day session in July 1956 and submitted the proposed constitutional amendments to the electorate for a statewide vote. Two months
later, in September 1956, the voters of North Carolina approved the
constitutional amendments allowing tuition grants and local referenda
on school closings by a four-to-one margin.94
89 Report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, Report, 1 RAcE REL. L.
REP. 581, 582-85 (1956).
90 Id. at 585.
91 N.C. Advisory Committee Asks 2 Constitutional Amendments, S. ScH. NEws, May 1956, at
6.
92 Moreover, in June 1955, in a statewide broadcast, Hodges had told the state that if school
boards failed to make a start toward compliance, they might face legal action forcing the admission of black students to white schools. Luther Hodges, Address over Statewide Radio-Television Network (June 6, 1955), in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at
152.
93 Luther Hodges, Message to the Special Session of the General Assembly (July 23, 1956),
in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 33.
94 N.C. Adopts 'Pearsall Plan' By 4 to 1; Challenge Quickly Filed in U.S. Court, S. ScH. NEws
Oct. 1956, at 7. Of the state's major newspapers, only the Charlotte Observer, Raleigh Times,
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Although the Pearsall Plan seemed to mark a significant shift in
the public policy of North Carolina on the segregation issue, in fact,
the plan did far less than the legislative schemes that had been
adopted in other southern states. Four states abolished state constitutional requirements of public education.95 Six states passed legislation
to withhold aid from schools that desegregated.96 Eight states enacted
interposition resolutions urging either outright defiance of the
Supreme Court's Brown decision or at least every possible action to
avoid its reach. 97 Ten states passed legislation that inhibited the activities of the NAACP.98 North Carolina was the only southern state to
take none of those actions. Indeed, North Carolina's General Assembly enacted fewer statutes and promulgated fewer resolutions
throughout the 1950s than did any other southern state legislature in
response to Brown.
Moreover, on close inspection, the Pearsall Plan promised more
than it actually delivered. The plan did not mandate school closings in
the face of desegregation; it merely permitted a local referendum on
the question in the school board's discretion. The distinction was an
important one. On at least one occasion, when a citizens' group
sought a school closing referendum over token integration, the local
school board simply denied the request. 99 Indeed, no school was ever
closed in North Carolina under the closing provision. By comparison,
legislation enacted in other southern states, such as Virginia, required
and Winston-Salem Journal opposed the plan. N.C. Editors State Pearsall Plan Views, DuRHAM
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 6, 1956, at 3A.
95 JoHN B. MARTIN, THE DEEP SoUTH SAYS "NEVER" 11 (1957). The four states were
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
96 The states were Arkansas, 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1042 (1958); Georgia, 1 RACE REL. L.
REP. 421 (1956); Louisiana, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956); Mississippi, 3 RAcE REL. L. REP.
553 (1958); South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 241 (1956); and Virginia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP.
1091 (1956).
97 See supra note 6. Governor Hodges was sharply criticized for the state's failure to enact
an interposition resolution. Letter from Lunsford Crew to Luther Hodges (Jan. 30, 1956) (on file
with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.).
98 Wilma C. Peebles, School Desegregation in Raleigh, North Carolina, 1954-1964, at 56
(1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). The 10
states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Six of these states passed particularly onerous legislation that
obliged the NAACP to disclose its membership lists. WASBY ET. AL, supra note 8, at 181-92. See
generally Walter Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. PoL. Q. 371
(1959).
99 Charlotte Parents Initiate Moves Aimed at Utilizing Pearsall Plan's Provisions, S. ScH.
NEws, Aug. 1958, at 15. The statute provided that the School Board had the authority to call for
a referendum upon being presented with a petition by 15% of the registered voters residing in
the area in question. Moreover, the school closing referendum could be restricted to the closure
of a single school, as opposed to the closure of all of the schools in the school system. Robert
Wettach, North Carolina School Legislation-1956, 35 N.C. L. REv. 1, 7 (1956).
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that schools close in the face of desegregation orders. 100 Dozens of
schools were eventually closed throughout the South in order to avoid
desegregation. 1m
Likewise, no student ever received a private school tuition grant
in North Carolina, even though thousands of these grants were provided in other southern states.102 When a student finally requested a
private school tuition grant in North Carolina, the grant provision was
deemed unconstitutional in a court challenge. 103 Significantly, the attorney arguing that the tuition grant provision was unconstitutional
had been a member of the Pearsall Committee responsible for its
adoption.
Accordingly, the Pearsall Plan did not reflect a major shift in the
views of the state's political leadership on the issue of school integration. Rather, it reflected the increasing militancy of southern segregationists and the need to defuse the pressure to take more extreme
action. In effect, the tuition grant and school closing components of
the Pearsall Plan served a symbolic function: they placated segregationists, but left the state's public schools essentially untouched.
Hodges referred to the school closing and tuition grant provisions as
"safety valves." 104 Pearsall himself later explained his perceptions of
the Committee's motivations: "What we were doing was buying time.
The people had to have a psychological safety valve. They had to
100 Virginia's pupil placement statute was declared unconstitutional in January 1957 in large
part because of the mandatory school closing provision. Adkins v. School Bd. of Newport
News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957).
101 Lawyer Recalls 'Buying Time' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976,
at 1. Moreover, when a few North Carolina school districts admitted black students to white
schools for the first time in 1957, Governor Hodges did nothing to stop it, noting that the placement statute gave local school boards the authority to make their own decisions.
While Hodges sat silent, Governor Faubus of Arkansas, also a southern "moderate" governor, threw his state into an uproar by seeking to prevent the simultaneous desegregation of the
Little Rock schools. Whereas Faubus legitimized violent resistance to desegregation in Arkansas by his conduct and statements, Hodges avoided the issue. Arkansas would experience a
substantial downturn in new business investment in the several years following the Little Rock
crisis, but North Carolina, under the leadership of its "businessman in the statehouse," experienced no such downturn. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE HIGH COST OF CONFLicr: A
RouNDUP oF OPINION FROM THE SoUTHERN BusiNESS CoMMUNITY ON THE EcoNOMIC CoNSE·
QUENCES OF SCHOOL CI:OSINGS AND VIOLENCE 1 (1963).
102 Editorial-First Job of Both Races: to Retain Public Schools, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Nov. 14, 1963, at 2B.
103 No Surprise Involved in End to Plan, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Apr. 5, 1966, at 1.
104 Luther Hodges, Address Before Combined Parent-Teacher Associations of Cabarrus
County (Apr. 20, 1956), in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 331.
State Treasurer Edwin Gill emphasized this point in a radio address in September 1956:
It is the hope of the supporters of the Pearsall Plan that under its terms no single school
will be closed, and that it will be unnecessary to provide a single educational expense grant.
In other words, the Pearsall Plan is offered as a last resort if other programs fail. That is
why the provisions for educational expense grants and local option are called safety valves
to be used only when all other means have failed to give relief to deeply-felt emotions and
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know that if things really got terrible, they could close the schools ....
The plan gave desperate people something to hang onto while we proceeded, little by little, with integration." 105 Although Pearsall's comments were clearly self-serving, he was probably on target.
Desegregation would inevitably come to North Carolina, but the
Pearsall Plan gave the state's political leaders an opportunity to appease segregationist sentiment without unduly disrupting the state's
public schools.
To be sure, the southern mood on desegregation had noticeably
stiffened by 1956.106 Although there had been some resistance to
Brown during the first year following the decision, many southern politicians, understanding that political capital could be gained from
resistance, began to take more aggressive postures of defiance in early
1956. Beginning in February of that year, one southern state legislature after another passed nullification or interposition resolutions defying or at least challenging the Supreme Court's authority and they
passed more extensive legislation undermining efforts to desegregate
the schools.107 During the first three months of 1956, the legislatures
of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia-five
of the most defiant states-enacted a total of forty-two pro-segregation statutes.10S
Moreover, in March 1956, 92 of the 106 southern members of
Congress signed a "Southern Manifesto" which claimed that Brown
was illegitimate and that they would do everything they could to re-

other pent-up feelings that might otherwise explode and be destructive of the public
schools.
Edwin Gill, Radio Address 4 (Sept. 6, 1956) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.) (emphasis in original).
105 Lawyer Recalls 'Buying 1ime' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976,
at 1.
106 Public opinio_n polls are but one indicator of the changing mood. In 1954, 24% of
southerners approved of the Brown decision; by May 1955 (before the second Brown decision)
that figure had dropped to 20%. MELVIN TUMIN, SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: A DIGEST OF REcENT RESEARCH 105-07 (1957). In 1954, 15% of white southerners indicated that
they would not object to sending their children to an integrated school; by 1959, that figure was
8%. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 Pus. OPINION Q. 137, 140-41 (1962).
107 See supra notes 5 and 6. Arkansas, a relatively moderate state by southern standards,
provides a good example of shifting moods on the race issue. In 1956, Governor Orval Faubus
won re-election as the moderate candidate, defeating a challenge from a segregationist opponent. Yet less than a year later, Faubus shifted his position, personally directing an extraordinary
effort to thwart the desegregation of the Little Rock schools in defiance of a judicial order.
Faubus's blandishments on the segregation issue would win him several more terms in the governor's mansion. J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN: SoUTHERN FEDERAL JuDGES AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 32 (1961).
108 MusE, TEN YEARS oF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 66.
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verse it.l09 All but three members of the North Carolina delegation
signed the Manifesto. 110 The Manifesto legitimated defiance. As one
contemporary noted, "[T]he true meaning of the Manifesto was to
make defiance of the Supreme Court and the Constitution socially acceptable in the South-to give resistance to the law the approval of
the Southern Establishment."111
At the same time, the White House remained aloof from school
desegregation efforts, giving further encouragement to those urging
resistance. President Eisenhower steadfastly and repeatedly refused
to endorse the Brown decision. Eisenhower also declined to authorize
procedures for investigating complaints arising out of desegregation
efforts, and he refused to seek enforcement legislation from Congress.
Public opinion polls taken in the summer of 1955 indicated that the
public perceived the President as encouraging the maintenance of racial segregation. 112 In February 1956, when questioned about the various interposition resolutions enacted in southern states challenging
the Supreme Court's authority, Eisenhower responded weakly that
the issue was "filled with argument on both sides"; one month later,
he declined comment on the Southern Manifesto.113
As a result of the more aggressive activities of segregationists,
pressure increased on southern politicians to take additional action
against the threat of pupil mixing. In large measure, the Pearsall
Committee's 1956 proposals were intended to mute the demands of
North Carolina segregationists, such as Assistant Attorney General
Beverly Lake, who were ready to abandon the public school system
over the issue of segregation and who were building a political base
around that issue. In July 1955, Lake made a widely publicized speech
in which he called for an amendment to the state constitution that
109

The Manifesto read in part as follows:
We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a clear abuse of
judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States
and the people.
We commend the motives of those states which have declared the intention to resist
forced integration by any lawful means.

We pledge ourselves to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision
which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation.
102 CoNG. REc. 4515-16 (1956).
110 One North Carolina member, Congressman Cooley, called the Manifesto "a dangerous
document, calculated to aggravate the situation"; Cooley also concluded that it held out false
hope of legal resistance to Brown. Cooley Terms Racial Document 'Dangerous,' DuRHAM
MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 14, 1956, at 1A.
111 GoLDFIELD, supra note 23, at 65 (quoting Anthony Lewis).
112 RoBERT F. BuRK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 144-45,
152-53 (1984).
113 !d. at 160-62.
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would abolish the requirement of public schools.l 14 In August 1955,
within weeks of Lake's speech, Hodges hinted in a statewide address
that school closing might ultimately be required if his program of voluntary segregation failed: "[I]f we are not able to succeed in a program of voluntary separate school attendance, the State within the
next year or so will be face to face with deciding the issue of whether
it shall have some form of integrated public schools or shall abandon
its public schools."ll5
Governor Hodges changed his posture on the school closing and
tuition grant issues to deflect the attacks of segregationists such as
Lake. He justified his shift to a conference of editorial writers in May
1956: "If I hadn't come out for [the Pearsall Plan], a racist would have
run against me [for Governor] and torn our state apart with hatred."116 Hodges thwarted that threat by simply embracing certain aspects of the segregationist agenda while positioning both himself and
the Pearsall Plan as the "moderate" alternative. As Lake became
more vocal during the summer of 1955 on the segregation question by
attacking the NAACP, Hodges increased his own attacks on the
NAACP as an "extremist" organization composed of outsiders who
did not represent the views of most black North Carolinians. Moreover, Hodges supported Lake in the face of calls by the NAACP for
Lake's removal.117 In so doing, Hodges recognized that Lake was a
potent political force who gave expression to the resentments of many
white citizens. Pearsall later explained: "We didn't want Lake fired
114 Dr. Beverly Lake Amplifies Upon Position Taken in Asheboro Speech, RALEIGH NEws &
OBSERVER, July 20, 1955; HoDGES, supra note 73, at 84; John Batchelor, Rule of Law: North
Carolina School Desegregation from Brown to Swann, 1954-1974, 178-85 (1992) (unpublished
Ed. D. dissertation, North Carolina State University).
Segregationists other than Lake also promoted the closure of the schools to avoid desegregation. W.C. George, an anatomy professor at the University of North Carolina and later president of the segregationist Patriots of North Carolina, argued that the preservation of racial
purity required the abandonment of the public school system: "[W]e consider it more important
... to preserve the white and Negro races than to maintain the public school system." Charles
Dunn, An Exercise of Choice: North Carolina's Approach to the Segregation-Integration Crisis
in Public Education 80-81 (1959) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina
(Chapel Hill)).
115 LUTHER HoDGES, Address on State-Wide Radio-Television Network (Aug. 8, 1955), in
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 206.
116 May 1956 Statement to Editorial Writers Conference, quoted in Confidential Memorandum from Harry Golden to George Mitchell (May 23, 1956) (on file with the Kelly Miller Alexander, Sr., Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). Pearsall later
commented: "The last thing we wanted was for someone to run [for Governor in 1956] on the
race issue. That would force people to take positions and use rhetoric that we didn't want ....
If segregation got in the race, Hodges would [have had to] become more radical." Lawyer Recalls 'Buying 1ime' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, at 1. A significant portion of the electorate opposed pupil mixing and in much of the state segregation was
potentially an explosive issue, particularly in eastern North Carolina.
117 Hodges Defends Lake in Squabble, CHARLOTIE NEws, July 18, 1955.
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because he would be a martyr and a symbol. He could probably have
gotten elected governor, and a segregationist would have destroyed
everything. "1 18
Hodges's fears concerning Lake's political popularity were not
unfounded. Lake was well known throughout the state and by 1955
had emerged as the critical spokesman for the pro-segregation position in the state. Although several of the state's newspapers attacked
Lake as an extremist, particularly when he called for school closing
legislation,119 Lake enjoyed considerable popular support.12° Ultimately, Lake decided not to enter the 1956 gubernatorial race, but
Hodges did have to fend off a primary challenge during which he was
attacked for his "very lukewarm stand" on the desegregation issue. 121
In those same 1956 primaries, only one of the three North Carolina
congressmen who had refused to sign the Southern Manifesto rebuking Brown won renomination in campaigns dominated by the "Manifesto issue"; the one survivor assured voters that notwithstanding his
failure to sign the Manifesto, he favored the continuation of segre118

Lawyer Recalls 'Buying Time' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976,

at 1.

119 Editorial-A New Voice for the Extremists, CHARLOTrE NEws, July 15, 1955, at 6A; Editorial-Inciting the Extremists, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 15, 1955, at 4.
120 Within weeks of Lake's address, over 300 North Carolinians established the Patriots of
North Carolina, a statewide segregationist organization, and announced a plan seeking state
support for private schools. Patriots of North Carolina to Promote Segregation Plan, RALEIGH
NEws & OBSERVER, Aug. 23, 1955; Batchelor, supra note 114, at 188-91. Lake also began receiving hundreds of letters of support. Lawyer Recalls 'Buying Time' for Integration, RALEIGH
NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, at 1. Many North Carolinians signed petitions urging Lake to
challenge Hodges in the 1956 Democratic primary for governor. Letter from Lunsford Crew to
Luther Hodges (Jan. 30, 1956) (on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina
State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.). Lake eventually entered the Democratic primary for governor in
1960, capturing 44% of the vote. EARL BLACK, SoUTHERN GovERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACIAL SEGREGATION AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 219 (1976).
A survey of attitudes in 1955 toward desegregation in the Piedmont county of Guilford,
home to the city of Greensboro, found that 43% of the white respondents favored closing the
public schools in order to avoid desegregation and 56% of the white respondents favored withholding state funds from schools in order to prevent desegregation. MELVIN M. TUMIN, DESEGREGATION: RESISTANCE AND READINESS 34, 37, 45 (1958). Such strong anti-integration
sentiment in one of the state's more racially moderate regions indicated the degree of support
for segregation throughout the state.
121 N.C. Court Upholds Pupil Assignment in Initial Test, S. ScH. NEws, Apr. 1956, at 11. During the campaign, certain conservative political leaders such as State Representative Byrd Satterfield, who a year earlier had proposed the constitutional amendment abandoning the
requirement of public schools, likened Hodges to the leaders of the NAACP in his support for
school desegregation, an attack that could hardly have been more damning. Special Session of
N.C. Legislature Predicted After Segregation Report, S. ScH. NEws, Jan. 1956, at 4. Satterfield
later indicated that the only way to keep black children out of white schools was "to battle them
at the doors." N.C. Governor, in Election Bid, Suggests New School Laws, S. ScH. NEws, Mar.
1956, at 16.
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gated schools.122 Hodges and the General Assembly well understood
that segregation was a potent political issue in North Carolina in 1956.
E.

The Nature of North Carolina's "Moderation"

As North Carolina's leaders debated the wisdom of the Pearsall
Plan during the summer of 1956, participants on both sides in the debate sought to characterize their views as the "moderate" position. To
parry the efforts of those segregationists seeking more extreme action,
the Pearsall Plan's proponents described the plan as a "moderate"
step. State Senator Terry Sanford, one of the more progressive politicians in the state and Hodges's successor as Governor in 1960, championed the Pearsall Plan as advancing the cause of "moderation, unity,
understanding, and good-will." 123 William Joyner, Vice-Chair of the
Pearsall Committee and a prominent North Carolina lawyer, promoted the plan as "the moderate course." 124 The state's leading newspapers urged passage of the Pearsall Plan as a moderate response to
the desegregation problem. The Greensboro Daily News, for example, editorialized: "North Carolina wants no violence, and North Carolina wants no abandonment of its public school system. The path is
tortuous and narrow. But with moderation, goodwill, understanding
and wise, sound and far-seeing statesmanship we can and shall tread it
safely."125
Significantly, politicians who opposed the Pearsall Plan on the
ground that it could undermine public education also claimed to represent the "moderate" course. Irving Carlyle, for example, one of the
plan's chief opponents, urged North Carolinians to follow the route of
"moderation and not one of extremism" and to defeat the plan.126
That the politicians of the day would claim to represent the
"moderate" position speaks much about North Carolina and its selfperceptions during the 1950s. Throughout much of the South, those
politicians who called unapologetically for defiant segregation were
winning elections. Yet the rhythmic chants of segregationists such as
122 Two N.C. Solons Losers on Issue of 'Manifesto', S. SCH. NEws, June 1956, at 8.
123 Pearsall Plan: The Spirit of Moderation, GREENSBORO DAILY NEws, Sept. 2, 1956, at 6.

See also Terry Sanford, Speech to Junior Women's Club (Aug. 20, 1956) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh,
N.C.) (urging a "spirit of moderation").
124 Pearsall Plan is Legal, Joyner Tells Assembly, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, July 26, 1956,
at 1.
125 Editorial-Saturday's Election, GREENSBORO DAILY NEws, Sept.10, 1956, at 6 (emphasis
added}.
126 Carlyle Calls for Defeat of Pearsall Group Plan, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 3, 1956, at 1. See
also Letter from Irving Carlyle to Luther Hodges (July 5, 1956) (on file with Luther Hartwell
Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh N.C.) (urging moderation).
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Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver-"not one, no, not one" 127-were
not spoken by most North Carolinians who captured high political office. North Carolina politicians made competing claims of taking a
"moderate" position on racial issues. 12s
William Chafe has aptly described the "civility" of much of the
post-Brown debate in North Carolina over civil rights issues, where
appearances of moderation often proved more important than realities.129 To be sure, most white North Carolinians were no different
than their southern neighbors in their opposition to pupil mixing.
Governor Hodges adamantly opposed pupil mixing, 130 pleading time
and again with the state's black population to accept voluntary segregation as a means of avoiding social strife. What distinguished
Hodges and the majority of white politicians in North Carolina from
their counterparts in many other southern states, however, was a recognition that more was at stake than merely preserving racial
segregation.
At an early date, much of the state's business and political leadership recognized that defiant resistance to school desegregation, including school closings, could potentially damage the state's economic
future. As early as 1956, several prominent newspaper editors urged
the state to adapt itself to school desegregation demands for economic
reasons. Reed Sarratt, executive editor of the Winston-Salem Journal
and Sentinel, noted that the state's failure to adapt to the Brown decision would cause "untold damage ... to our economy." 131 C.A. McKnight, editor of the Charlotte Observer, made a similar claim. 132
Likewise, North Carolina Attorney General Malcolm Seawell told a
127 Calvin Trillin, Remembrance of Moderates Past, THE NEw YoRKER, Mar. 21, 1977, at 85.
Vandiver was governor of Georgia from 1959 until 1963.
128 Appeals to "moderation" were made in other of the nondefiant states. In February 1956,
for example, as much of the South debated interposition, the Memphis Commercial Appeal
called for the formation of an organization of "moderates" to resist those "who might seek to
impose radicalism of any sort on the rest of us." 'Moderation' is Key to North's Development in
Tennessee, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 1956, at 15.
129 CHAFE, supra note 58. The discussion of school desegregation throughout the state during
this time period bore the same quality.
130 Hodges remained firmly committed to the principle of segregation throughout his tenure
as Governor. As his administrative assistant Paul Johnston would explain to many constituents:
"You may be assured ... that Governor Hodges will continue to do everything in his power to
keep the races separated in all walks of life." Letter from Paul Johnston to Emma Byers (May
29, 1956) (on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh,
N.C.).
131 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, Voices of Moderation (July 1956)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, Atkins
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte).
132 Editor Sees Race Relations Hurt, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 12, 1956, at SA. The
Southern Regional Council by early 1956 called on chambers of commerce throughout the South
to urge "sensible" solutions to the desegregation problem as a matter of "long-range economic
benefit to the region." North Carolina Council on Human Relations, Integration Issue in the
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group of bankers that although he objected to the Brown decision,
defiance was inappropriate because of the social and economic havoc
it could cause the state.133 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on
Human Relations circulated a speech delivered by the executive vicepresident of the Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce in 1956 in
which he predicted the economic costs of resistance to Brown: "Boycotts, economic reprisals, the possibility ·of abandoning our public
schools, incidents of violence, irresponsible statements-these are
new factors which will now be give consideration by industry and business when they consider a Southern location."134
By the late 1950s, business leaders throughout the South were
well aware of the economic impact of defiant opposition to the Brown
decision. The severe downturn in new business that accompanied the
resistance to school desegregation in Little Rock was widely publicizedP5 Likewise, Virginia, which adopted a statewide policy of massive resistance, experienced a sharp decline in new business growth.
During the first three years of the 1950s, Virginia added approximately 31,000 manufacturing jobs per year; during the last three years
of the 1950s, after implementation of the state's widely publicized program of massive resistance, Virginia added approximately 5,000 new
manufacturing jobs per year. 136 Martin Gainsburgh, chief economist
New York Tzmes, HuM. REL. BuLL., Mar. 1956, at 5 (on file with Frederick Douglass Alexander
Papers, Box 121-86, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte).
133 Malcolm Seawell, North Carolina at a Crossroad, 14 NEw SoUTH 3 (1959).
134 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, Role of Business Leaders (1956)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86,
Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). The Southern
Regional Council echoed a similar theme in 1956, calling on Chambers of Commerce throughout
the South to urge "sensible" solutions to the desegregation problem as a matter of "long-range
economic benefit to the region." ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 27, 1956, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 33.
135 Both Arkansas in general and Little Rock in particular experienced a significant reduction
in new business as a result of its staunch resistance to the integration of Central High School in
1957. In 1958, Arkansas received only $25 million in new plant investment. In comparison,
North Carolina received over 10 times that amount. Preston Holmes, Credit in the Development
of the South, U. VA. NEWSL., Oct. 15,1959, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note
101, at 1. Indeed, in 1958 and 1959, no new industrial plants moved to Little Rock; over the
prior eight years, an average of five new plants had located in the city each year bringing with
them about 300 new jobs per year. NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, May 31, 1959, quoted in ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 11-12. One Little Rock bank executive commented:
"I personally know of a firm employing several hundred people which had taken the preliminary
steps to move to Little Rock. A poll of key employees led them to abandon the plan when wives
of the executives feared that public school opportunities would be denied their children." ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 14. After the Little Rock school crisis of 1957-1958,
two members of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce traveled throughout the South speaking
about the impact of that city's racial problems on recruitment of new business. See CoBB, supra
note 15, at 125.
136 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 8. Other parts of the South would also
experience downturns in business growth as a result of racial strife during the late 1950s and
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for the National Industrial Conference Board, explained the economic
impact of defiance: "[Businesses] eliminate from further consideration areas which have this school problem, because of the friction involved in them and the difficulty of getting top personnel to move to
such places with their children. " 137
Governor Hodges, one of the region's most active gubernatorial
business recruiters, was particularly sensitive to the impact of the region's racial problems on the recruitment of new capital. At least one
company during Hodges's tenure as Governor expressly declined to
locate in North Carolina because of the state's perceived racial
problems.B8 Both Hodges and his successor in the Governor's mansion, Terry Sanford, aggressively used the state's reputation for racial
moderation to recruit new industry.139 Both men recognized that
overt resistance to the Brown decision could cause economic damage
to the state. North Carolina's "moderation" ultimately produced tangible economic benefits. Preston Holmes, a Richmond banker, contrasted North Carolina's "moderation" with Arkansas's defiance in a
1959 article: "North Carolina, with legal compliance with the
Supreme Court decision and little social unrest, had new plant investment in 1958 totaling $253 million, while Arkansas, with its massive
resistance and unsettled conditions, had only $25.4 million in 1958
compared with ... $131 million in 1956."14 0
early 1960s. According to a representative of the state's Industrial and Agricultural Development Commission, resistance to school desegregation in Nashville cost the state new capital.
ATLANTA J.-CoNST., Mar. 30, 1958, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 6.
As New Orleans engaged in massive resistance to prevent the admission of a handful of black
children into white schools, a Tulane economist predicted that the defiance would cost the city
millions of dollars per year as "[n]ational publicity about schools closing would strongly deter
new industrial or business development from outside the state." ANn-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
supra note 101, at 18. In Birmingham, the violent resistance to the Freedom Riders in the spring
of 1961 cost the city potential new capital in excess of $40 million, according to a Wall Street
Journal report. Many Southerners Say Racial Tension Slows Area's Economic Gains, WALL ST.
J., May 26, 1961, at 1.
Moreover, in addition to the loss of new capital, many southern businessmen worried about
the loss of an educated workforce in the wake of school closures. See, e.g., ATLANTA J., Jan. 20,
1960, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 33.
137 ATLANTA CoNST., Feb. 27, 1959, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101,
at 33. To be sure, some observers have concluded that southern cities overestimated the importance to which industries that came South during the 1950s and 1960s attached to a city's race
relations. See, e.g., James C. Cobb, Yesterday's Liberalism, in SOUTHERN BusiNESSMEN AND
DESEGREGATION 166-67 (Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn eds., 1982); A. C. Flora, Industrial Location in South Carolina, 10 Bus. & EcoN. REv. 1 (1964). Nevertheless, certainly the
perception existed in the wake of the Little Rock experience that racial strife affected a city's
ability to recruit new business.
138 CoBB, supra note 15, at 123.
139 !d. at 147.
140 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 1.
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There was a second reason for North Carolina's more moderate
response to Brown. The state's political leaders understood that legislative pronouncements and resolutions expressing defiance of Brown
could lead to judicial intervention in the state's school system, resulting in even more widespread pupil mixing. Indeed, North Carolina's
political leadership, while consenting to the school closing and tuition
grant features of the Pearsall Plan, well understood that the plan must
not operate as a device to maintain rigid segregation. As the state in
the pre-Brown period had opened graduate programs for black students, improved black teacher salaries, and increased expenditures for
black schools in order to avoid judicial intervention,141 many North
Carolinians now understood the need to engage in token desegregation to avoid judicial meddling in pupil assignments.
In a widely publicized speech to the North Carolina State Bar in
November 1956, two months after the enactment of the Pearsall Plan,
William Joyner, the Vice-Chair of the Pearsall Committee and a distinguished Raleigh attorney, noted that several other southern states
had vowed never to admit a black child to a white school. According
to Joyner, those states would eventually face either the abandonment
of public education or court-mandated integration; neither option was
acceptable. Joyner, who described himself as a "man in the middle"
on the desegregation issue, stated:
[S]ome mixing in some of our schools is inevitable and must occur. . . . I do not hesitate to advance my personal opinion and it is that
the admission of less than one percent, for example, one-tenth of one
percent of Negro children to schools theretofore attended only by white
children, is a small price to pay for the ability to keep the mixing within
the bounds of reasonable control. ...
One of the nightmares which besets me on a restless night is that I
am in a Federal court attempting to defend a school board in its rejection of a transfer [to a white school] requested by a Negro student, when
a showing is made in that court that nowhere in all of the State of North
Carolina has a single Negro ever been admitted to any one of more than
2,000 schools attended by white students.142
Subsequently, Joyner told Kenneth Whitsett, Mecklenburg County
head of a segregationist organization called the Patriots of North Carolina, that the "sacrifice of some children to mixed schools must be
made so that many other children will not similarly be subjected to the
evils of mixed schools."143 Joyner's comments reflected the pragmatism of white political leadership in North Carolina in the 1950s.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 43-52.
142 The Middle Road is Best, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, July 28,

1957, at 2B; 3 N.C. Cities Assign
12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957, at 3.
143 SOUTHERN REGIONAL CoUNCIL, SPECIAL REPORT ON CHARLOITE, GREENSBORO, AND
WINSTON-SALEM, NoRTH CAROLINA 2 (1957) (on file with the NAACP Papers, Box 111-A-105,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Joyner made the comments in response to Whitsett's
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Likewise, North Carolina was the only southern state to resist
passing legislation inhibiting the activities of the NAACP. In May
1957, the North Carolina General Assembly, prompted by Assistant
Attorney General Lake, considered legislation to require the organization to disclose its membership lists and to prohibit the organization
from paying litigation costs. 144 In significant measure, the General
Assembly rejected the proposed legislation because of fear of judicial
intervention in the state's school desegregation efforts. State Representative Frank Snepp of Charlotte, one of the primary opponents of
the anti-NAACP legislation in the state House, argued that not only
would the legislation cause "bitterness and disunity" and "open the
way for economic reprisals" against NAACP members, 145 it might also
lead a federal court to scrutinize more closely the state's recently
passed pupil assignment plan. Snepp claimed that the bill "is unconopposition to the admission of four black students into three all-white senior and junior high
schools in Charlotte.
144 Governor Hodges, having been accused by his conservative critics of being unduly sympathetic to the NAACP, threw his weight behind the proposal, arguing that the organization was an
outsider interfering with North Carolina's efforts to work out its school problems. 9 Representatives Would Tell NAACP to Bare Member List, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, May 7, 1957;
Editorial-Unnecessary Law, AsHEVILLE CmzEN, May 11, 1957, at 4 (reprint of editorial from
Winston-Salem J.); Administration Measures are Directed at NAACP, RALEIGH NEws & OB·
SERVER, May 17, 1957, at 1.
The NAACP had long been subject to vocal attack in North Carolina. Both Hodges and the
Pearsall Committee on several occasions attacked the organization for its aggressive integrationist posture. Segregationist Beverly Lake was even more strident in his attacks on the organization:
The NAACP is our enemy, not the Negro people. We shall fight the NAACP county by
county, city by city and, if need be, school by school and classroom by classroom to preserve
our public schools....
It will be a bitter and costly fight. We can also make it a costly one for our enemies,
both foreign and domestic.
Wake County Takes Far-Reaching Step, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1955, at 3. Lake ultimately helped
draft the anti-NAACP legislation, claiming that it would help prevent an "unspeakable tragedy"-amalgamation of the races. NAACP Head Says Bills Won't Stop Clamor for Equality,
RALEIGH NEws & OBsERVER, May 29, 1957, at 3.
The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP attempted to fend off the legislative efforts.
State President Kelly Alexander, seeking to appeal to the anti-communist feelings of most North
Carolinians, told the North Carolina General Assembly that his organization had fought against
communism's "efforts to capitalize on the justifiable resentment Negroes feel against segregation
and discrimination," and that the legislation threatened the state's "reputation for friendly race
relations." Kelly Alexander, Statement of North Carolina State Conference of Branches,
NAACP, to North Carolina General Assembly (May 28, 1957) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-279, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Ultimately,
the North Carolina General Assembly defeated the proposed legislation.
In light of the defeat of the anti-NAACP legislation, the organization remained a viable
force in North Carolina. The NAACP would enjoy much greater success in the 1960s. In 1963
alone, 10 North Carolina school districts desegregated after initial pressure of one form or another from the NAACP. NAACP, IN FREEDOM's VANGUARD: NAACP REPORT FOR 1963, at 9
(1964).
145 Racial Bill Approved by Group, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 6, 1957, at SA.
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stitutional on its face . . . . [A]ll we are doing is putting the State to a
court test . . . . We've been fortunate in this matter, but if the federal
court knocks this down it will set a pattern, our school laws on the
subject would be in danger." 146 Snepp had a keen sense of the
broader picture. Taking retributive action against the NAACP could
undermine the more important goal of fending off judicial interference with the pupil assignment process.
At the same time, others feared the legislation could damage the
state's reputation for racial moderation, causing untoward economic
consequences. In Charlotte, from which came many of the bill's most
avid opponents, the Charlotte Observer claimed that the legislation
would harm "North Carolina's good name as a progressive, enlightened, fair state." 147 To be sure, North Carolina's failure to take retributive action against the NAACP can be attributed in part to a less
harsh racial environment within the state. Nevertheless, the desire of
the state's political leaders to avoid both judicially-mandated pupil integration and damage to the state's economically beneficial moderate
reputation on racial matters were critical factors as well.
F.

Reasons for North Carolina's Moderation

Why did Hodges and the North Carolina "moderates" ultimately
prevail over Lake and those North Carolinians calling for a more defiant response to the Brown decision? Why did North Carolina not
adopt the more extreme segregationist measures adopted in other
southern states? The answer lies in large measure in two factors: the
domination of North Carolina politics for much of this century by a
business and financial elite committed to economic advancement and
the avoidance of racial strife, and the relative political insignificance
of the heavily black, rural counties of eastern North Carolina.
Unlike many southern states, North Carolina, with a relatively
small slave population, had no rural planter elite that dominated the
state's politics during the antebellum or Reconstruction eras.148 Instead, a financial and business elite emerged in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as a "progressive plutocracy," which dominated the state's politics for much of this century.149 This business
146 NAACP North Carolina State Conference of Branches, Action Letter (June 1, 1957) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-279, Washington, D.C., Library of Congress); Anti-NAACP Bill In Trouble, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, May 31, 1957,
atA3.
147 Editorial-It is Not Worthy of this State, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 4, 1957, at 2C.
148 Thad L. Beyle, The Paradox of North Carolina, in PoLITICS AND PoLICY IN NoRTH CAROLINA 4 (Thad L. Beyle & Merle Black eds., 1975).
149 KEY, supra note 18, at 214. Following Key's 1948 classic work, Southern Politics in State
and Nation, scholars have debated whether Key's characterization of North Carolina as "progressive" is accurate. See, e.g., LuEBKE, TAR HEEL POLITICS, supra note 16, at 1; Paul Luebke,
Corporate Conservatism and Government Moderation in North Carolina, in 1 PERSPECDVES ON
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elite committed itself to the aggressive promotion of industrial
growth.1 50 Indeed, during the first half of this century, North Carolina
enjoyed a substantially greater increase in its manufacturing activity
than did any other southern state.t51
North Carolina's business and political elite understood early on
the .relationship between economic prosperity and positive race relations. Throughout the first half of this century, North Carolina's political leaders, although unwavering proponents of racial separation,
supported black education for reasons of paternalism and the potential economic benefits to the state. In 1902, Governor Charles Aycock
and his allies helped defeat a proposed state constitutional amendment that would have allowed the division of school monies based on
the respective contributions of the two races, arguing in part that underfinancing black schools might encourage black emigration from the
state, thereby eliminating a necessary part of the workforce. 152 Concerns about black emigration were legitimate; in the wake of ratification of an amendment to the North Carolina Constitution
disfranchising black voters in 1900, large numbers of North Carolina
blacks, including one retiring congressman, left the state in search of
better opportunities in the North, creating labor shortages in some
areas. 153 Similarly, for most of the first half of this century, North
Carolina maintained a smaller gap in per pupil expenditures for black
and white children than did any other southern state and was the first
THE AMERICAN SoUTH: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIETY, PoLmCS AND CULTURE 107 (Merle
Black & John Shelton Reed eds., 1981); BAss & DEVRIES, supra note 74, at 229; Beyle, supra
note 148, at 1; Preston W. Edsall & J. Oliver Williams, North Carolina: Bipartisan Paradox, in
THE CHANGING PoLITICS oF THE SoUTH 366 (William C. Havard ed., 1972). Most would concede, however, to the extent that "progressive" is defined in terms of promoting industrial expansion, the state has indeed been progressive for much of this century. Luebke, Corporative
Conservatism and Government Moderation in North Carolina, supra, at 107-08.
150 For example, North Carolina initiated one of the South's most aggressive highway building projects during the 1920s and spent a higher percentage of the state's wealth on public education than virtually every other southern state. KEY, supra note 18, at 211; LuEBKE, TAR HEEL
PoLITICS, supra note 16, at 9. As a result, by the middle of the twentieth century, North Carolina
had one of the best road systems in the South and ranked fifth in the nation in the percentage of
its income spent on public education. North Carolina: The Integration Issue, RALEIGH NEws &
OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 1956.
151 KEY, supra note 18, at 209-10.
152 Lours R. HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PUBLIC ScHOOL CAMPAIGNS AND RACISM
IN THE SOUTHERN SEABOARD STATES, 1901-1915, at 40 (1958); W.E.B. Du Bors & AUGUSTUS
G. DILL, THE CoMMON ScHOOL AND THE NEGRO AMERICAN 50 {1911). To be sure, notwithstanding the defeat of the constitutional amendment, black schools lagged far behind white
schools in terms of per pupil expenditures due in large measure to the broad discretion local
school boards exercised in the disbursement of educational monies. One 1909 study suggested
that black schools in North Carolina received even less money than they would have under a
separate taxation plan. CHARLES L. CooN, PUBLIC TAXATION AND NEGRO ScHOOLS 7-8 {1909).
153 Janette Thomas Greenwood, Bittersweet Legacy: The Black and White "Better Classes"
in Charlotte, North Carolina, 1850-1910, at 534-36 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia).
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southern state to provide graduate education programs for black students.154 Moreover, repression of the black vote was less severe in
North Carolina than in other southern states; for much of the preBrown era, a higher percentage of blacks were registered to vote than
in any other southern state.
This racial paternalism may have been influenced by lawyers' traditionally dominant role in North Carolina's politics. For the first half
of this century, every governor of North Carolina was a lawyer, as
were large numbers of the state's leading legislators. These politicianlawyers were particularly sensitive to threats of judicial intervention in
the state's educational system.155 As a result, North Carolina responded more quickly than did most southern states to changing legal
expectations pertaining to the financing of black education during the
late 1930s and early 1940s, and pupil mixing in the 1950s.156
North Carolina's racial "moderation" was also influenced by the
fact that the majority black counties in eastern North Carolina did not
exert the same degree of political influence as did similar "black belt"
areas in other southern states. Political scientists have long recognized
a correlation in southern voting patterns between areas of high black
population and support for segregationist measures.157 In North Carolina, political power for most of this century has been linked to the
business and financial interests of the state's central Piedmont section,
as opposed to the rural farming areas of the state's eastern counties.158
Moreover, a strong Democratic party organization for much of the
first half of this century helped reduce the threat of extremists-on
racial or other issues-seizing political power. This distribution of
political power in North Carolina stands in sharp contrast to the more
defiant southern states of the deep South or Virginia, where political
power was far more likely to be linked to rural counties with high
black populations.159 Indeed, North Carolina had a smaller black
population than did most of the defiant states of the South and substantially fewer majority black counties. In 1950, for example, less
154 See supra note 42. Governor Clyde Hoey supported the establishment of graduate programs for black students noting that "North Carolina does not believe in social equality between
the races, but we do believe in equality of opportunity in their respective fields of service."
CLYDE HoEY, ADDRESSES, LE:ITERS AND PAPERS OF CLYDE RoARK HoEY, GovERNOR OF
NoRTH CAROLINA, 1937-1941, at 38 (David Corbitt ed., 1944).
155 Edsall & Williams, supra note 149, at 371; Beyle, supra note 148, at 4.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 43-52. Newspapers may have also played a role since
many of the state's leading newspapers expressed views, particularly on matters of race, that
tended to be more liberal than many of their southern counterparts. Beyle, supra note 148, at 3;
JACK CLAIBORNE, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER: ITS TIME AND PLACE, 1869-1986 (1986).
157 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 120, at 53, 67, 81, 94, 101, 114; KEY, supra note 18, at 229.
158 KEY, supra note 18, at 217-18; Beyle, supra note 148, at 5.
159 Moreover, legislative apportionment schemes favoring rural counties contributed to this
domination by segregationist interests in other southern states until the 1960s when the Supreme
Court struck down these schemes in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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than ten percent of the state's counties were majority black; each of
the six most defiant southern states had a significantly higher percentage of majority black counties than did North Carolina.t6o
Significantly, the only election in the post-Brown South in which
a moderate segregationist defeated a militant segregationist in a headto-head primary election was the 1960 Democratic runoff primary for
governor of North Carolina when Terry Sanford defeated Beverly
Lake. 161 Lake enjoyed strong support in the state's black belt counties, but Sanford's strong support in the Piedmont and the western
section of the state allowed him to capture his party's nomination. 162
Sanford presented himself as a candidate who understood the necessity of token integration in the service of larger interests:
Nobody likes the Supreme Court decision and nobody intends to let the
NAACP dominate North Carolina, but it is not going to serve any constructive purpose to keep saying this over and over. The more we stir it
up, the harder it is going to be to keep the Supreme Court out of North
Carolina's affairs. [Lake's] approach is leading us to closed schools or
mixed schools, and we have got to stop his approach.163

In a state where the preservation of racial separation at all costs was
no longer the highest goal, Sanford captured well over half the votes
cast.l 64

IV.

THE RESULTS oF MoDERATION IN NoRTH CAROLINA

A.

North Carolina's Token Integration

North Carolina's "moderate" response to Brown did not mean
that black children were welcome in the state's white schools. Indeed,
ten years after the Brown decision, less than one half of one percent of
the schoolchildren in the state attended school with a child of another
race. Other southern states that engaged in more strident resistance
actually had more children attending integrated schools in 1964 than
did North Carolina. 165 How did North Carolina's course of "moderation" result in the retention of segregated schools?
160 AsHMORE, supra note 16, at 173-204. Even Virginia, which had a smaller black population
than North Carolina on a statewide basis, had a substantially higher percentage of counties with
a majority black population than did North Carolina. ld. These counties, most of which were
located in southern Virginia, exercised substantial political power.
161 BLACK, supra note 120, at 217-19. Lake did carry the black belt counties in eastern North
Carolina and also did well among lower class whites in the Piedmont section of the state. NuMAN V. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM, SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 76 (1975).
162 Although Sanford was clearly more racially moderate than Lake, he nevertheless made
clear that he opposed "mixing the races in the schools." BLAcK, supra note 120, at 218.
163 !d.
164 Sanford captured 56% of the vote in the runoff against Lake and in November 1960 was
elected governor. BLACK, supra note 120, at 219.
165 See supra note 11.
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In effect, North Carolina "succeeded" in retaining segregated
schools because it understood that voluntary token desegregation and
avoidance of statements of defiance would allow the state to continue
with segregated schools without judicial interference. Following enactment of the 1955 pupil assignment statute that vested local school
boards with the discretion to make pupil assignments on a nonracial
basis, every North Carolina school board ostensibly abandoned racebased school assignments.166 Yet in reality, most of the state's school
boards would continue to assign children to school on the basis of
their race until the mid-1960s.167 Black children who lived within
walking distance of a white school were frequently assigned to a distant and inferior black school.1 68 In a few instances, where a school
system provided schools only for white children, black children were
required to travel by bus to schools in neighboring counties.169
The pupil assignment statute did give black children the right to
request a transfer to a white school and a number of black students
initially assigned to black schools sought such transfers. However,
none of the fifty black students who requested a transfer to a white
school during the first two school years under the new placement statute was successful.170 Even counties that offered no education for
166 Prior to Brown, every school district in North Carolina, as throughout the South, had
assigned students to school based upon their race. Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the
Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REv. 517 {1959).
167 A few North Carolina school districts began to assign students on the basis of geography
rather than race in the early 1960s. For example, Chapel Hill did so in 1961. See infra note 191.
Charlotte did likewise in 1962, although on a limited basis, with a plan that encompassed only a
fraction of the school district's schools.
168 Such was the case, for example, in Charlotte. Morrow v. Mecklenburg County Bd. of
Educ., 195 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.N.C. 1961).
169 Most typically this happened in the state's western counties with small black populations.
Such children sometimes faced as much as an 80 mile round trip to school along narrow mountain roads. Griffith v. Board of Educ. of Yancey County, 186 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.N.C. 1960).
170 North carolina Advisory Committee, Equal Protection of the Law in Education in North
Carolina {1960) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-288, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
The Wake County School Board did announce in August 1955 that beginning with the 19561957 school year, race would no longer be a factor in school assignments. North Carolina's Wake
County Takes Far-Reaching Step, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1955, at 3. Notwithstanding that pronouncement, neither the Wake County nor any other North Carolina school board assigned a
black student to a white school or granted a transfer request of a black student for the 1956-1957
school year.
Transfers were denied for a number of reasons. In one county, the request to transfer was
denied because the black student had expressed a desire to transfer to a "white" school; the
Board determined it could not make "assignments based on race" and denied the transfer. A.B.
Cochran, Desegregating Public Education in North Carolina, in PoLmcs AND POLICY IN NoRTH
CAROLINA 198, 200 {Thad L. Beyle & Merle Black eds., 1975). Other requests were denied
because the black child requested any "desegregated school" instead of a specific school. Board
Tells Parents of Negroes Why Reassignments Were Not Made, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Aug. 20,
1957, at 3A.
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black children denied transfer requests. 171 By the summer of 1957, no
school board in North Carolina had ever assigned a black child to a
white school and no school board had ever granted a black child's
transfer request to attend a white school.
In time, however, many North Carolinians argued that continued
refusal to admit black students to white schools could leave the state's
school systems exposed to judicial challenge. 172 Accordingly, some of
the state's political lea_ders, including Pearsall Committee Vice Chair
Joyner, urged several of the state's local school boards to admit a few
black students into white schools to demonstrate to the courts that
North Carolina's pupil assignment system was not designed to preserve segregated schools. Ultimately, three North Carolina school
boards-Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem-became
among the first in the South to desegregate their schools voluntarily
when they simultaneously announced in July 1957 that they had
granted the transfer requests of twelve black students to white
schools. 173 That this early desegregation would come in these three
cities was not surprising. Each was a Piedmont city, removed from the
large black population of eastern North Carolina; each constituted
one of the state's largest urban areas; and each had a thriving local
economy. All of these conditions contributed to an environment
where modest racial change was most likely.174
In agreeing to voluntary desegregation in the summer of 1957,
these three school boards operated with the understanding that their
action would fend off more extensive court-ordered desegregation.
The Charlotte School Board, for example, announced that in granting
the transfers, it had acted to "preserve the public schools of Charlotte."175 Several of the state's newspapers argued that the token inte171 For example, black children in the mountain town of Bryson City sought to attend a local
white school to avoid a 45 mile round trip to a black school in Sylva, located in a neighboring
county. The request was denied. N.C. Pupil Assignment Faces Test, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER,
July 21, 1957, at 2D.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
173 Beginning in 1955, the three school boards had met secretly to discuss the eventual desegregation of their respective school systems. During the spring and summer of 1957, the three
boards agreed to accept the transfer requests of a few black students to white schools for the
1957-1958 school year. The three boards decided that each would announce on July 23 that the
transfer requests of 12 black students in the three cities had been granted. Charlotte granted five
of 45 transfer requests; Greensboro granted six of 13 transfer requests; Winston-Salem granted
one of four transfer requests. 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S.
ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957, at 3.
174 See generally William Coogan, School Board Decisions on Desegregation in North Carolina (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, l!niversity of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)) (analyzing conditions under which desegregation more likely); Lamanna, supra note 77 (analyzing
conditions favorable to desegregation).
175 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957,
at 3.
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gration would forestall widespread pupil mixing. The Charlotte News
claimed that "the Charlotte City School Board has acted to preserve
the schools. It has acted to prevent massive court-decreed integration."176 The Charlotte Observer described the voluntary desegregation as a "legal and effective instrument for keeping desegregation a
limited and selective process" thereby avoiding "an inevitable court
order for mandatory desegregation," and enhancing "the progressive
tradition of the three communities and of this state."177 The Raleigh
Times suggested that the three school boards' action "will make it possible for schools in areas where integration is surely not possible or
even feasible to continue completely separate schools. This action has
been taken for the benefit of the whole school system of the state, not
just for the benefit of the 12 Negro children involved."178
Many of the state's political leaders also hoped that the decision
of the three boards would fend off broader, court-imposed desegregation orders.179 State Representative Edward Yarborough of Franklin
County, Chair of the state House Education Committee and a member of the Pearsall Committee, commended the three school boards
for their decision: "I think it certainly strengthens our hands in the
courts because it shows we have non-discriminatory laws, administered by local boards. "180
When schools opened in the fall of 1957, North Carolina was one
of only four southern states, along with Arkansas, Texas and Tennessee, to admit black students into white schools.181 Moreover, the relatively peaceful integration of the North Carolina schools stood in
sharp contrast to that in Little Rock and won the state national and
even worldwide acclaim. In the fall of 1957, for example, the Voice of
America contrasted the North Carolina and Arkansas desegregation
experiences, citing North Carolina as indicative of the real sentiment
of the country.182 Over the next several years, a time when many
176
177

Id. at 5.
Editorial-Wisdom, Courage, and Law Dictate a School Decision, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 24, 1957, at 2B. Fred Helms, a prominent Charlotte attorney and a member of the
original Pearsall Committee, told a civic club audience that business and professional persons
should lead the community in acceptance of desegregation. North Carolina's "course of moderation" would succeed, urged Helms, whereas courts would strike down the more extreme school
statutes in other states. State School Policy Hailed by Speaker, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 2,
1957, at lB. Helms further noted that: "If the pupils in our schools and the great mass of moderates can be left free from extremists, agitation, intolerance and prejudices, our problems will be
reduced to a minimum." S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 1957, at 15.
178 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957,
at 3.
179 Integration Seen Bolstering Law, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 24, 1957, at 2A.
180 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, supra note 178.
181 SoUTHERN Eouc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 26. In addition to these four states,
however, all of the border states had integrated at least some of their schools. Id.
182 Marion Wright, Integration and Public Morals, NEw SoUTH, Nov. 1957, at 7.
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southern cities reported downturns in business growth as a result of
racial problems, chambers of commerce in the state's leading cities
reported generous increases in new business.183
The voluntary desegregation of these three school systems, however, did not bring broader desegregation to North Carolina. During
the same summer that the three urban school boards granted the
twelve transfer requests, the requests of almost two hundred other
black students throughout the state,184 even those living in counties
with no black schools, were denied.1 85 Moreover, even in the three
desegregated school systems, the degree of desegregation did not increase during the next few years; by the spring of 1959, fewer black
students were attending white schools in North Carolina than in September 1957.186 Indeed, by 1960, no school board in North Carolina
183 See, e.g., Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, CHARLOTIE (Jan. 1962, Jan. 1963, Aug. 1963)
(on file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 114A-l, Atkins Library, University
of North Carolina at Charlotte).
184 Throughout the state, 184 requests for transfers by black students were denied during the
summer of 1957. North Carolina Advisory Committee, supra note 170. See, e.g., 66 School Applications Rejected, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 1957, at lB; Larry Jinks, Students May Ask
for Reassignment, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Aug. 3, 1957, at lB.
185 All-White School Eyed by Negroes, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, July 10, 1957, at 6A. In counties that had no black schools, black children were transported to schools in neighboring
counties.
186 For example, the following year, the Charlotte School Board assigned no additional black
students to a white school and approved only two out of 23 transfer requests filed by black
students; once again, only four black students attended a white school in Charlotte that year. In
1959, the Charlotte School Board denied every transfer request, continuing its policy of denying
all transfer requests of black students who lived closer to their assigned black school than to the
desired white school. Only one black student attended a white school in Charlotte during the
1959-1960 school year, three fewer than two years earlier. Three Localities Begin Desegregation;
Total Now Stands at Seven, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 1959, at 10.
Greensboro, one of the other North Carolina cities to desegregate in 1957, was also slow to
expand from the initial token desegregation. In 1963, six years after the first desegregation, only
19 black children attended white schools in Greensboro and all of these were in the same school.
CHAFE, supra note 58, at 151-52.
Finally, during the 1959-60 school year, school boards outside of the original three cities
granted transfer requests of black students for the first time: Durham, High Point, Wayne
County, and Craven County. The Wayne County and Craven County school systems were the
sites of major military installations and the desegregation in those counties took place at schools
attended primarily by the children of military personnel, many of whom were non-southerners.
Indeed, a school at the Fort Bragg military installation operated by the federal government had
been desegregated in 1951. JEFFREY J. CROW ET AL., A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN
NORTH CAROLINA 167 (1992); AsHMORE, supra note 16. More black students in those two
school systems attended white schools in 1959-60 than in all other school systems in the state
combined. American Friends Service Committee, Newsletter (Oct. 1959) (on file with the North
Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)); North Carolina Advisory
Committee, Equal Protection of the Laws (1960) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
NAACP Papers, Box 111-A-288, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
By 1960, six years after the Brown decision, only 34 of over 300,000 black students in North
Carolina attended school with white children and these 34-all of whom had to file a transfer
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had ever initially assigned a black student to a white school and most
of the hundreds of transfer requests filed by black students had been
denied. 187 At the same time, no court had ever found a North Carolina school system to be unconstitutionally segregated188 even though
the NAACP initiated more school desegregation litigation in North
Carolina during the 1950s than in any other southern statets9 and a
few courts had found unlawful school segregation in other southern
states.190 The obvious fact that every North Carolina school board
was continuing to maintain a dual assignment system by initially· assigning children only to schools of their own race went uncorrected by
the courts until the early 1960s.191 Token integration, unaccompanied
by defiant rhetoric, enabled the state to escape judicial intervention in
a manner that other, more defiant southern states did not.192 North
Carolina's policy of moderation stood vindicated.
request-were located in only 7 of the state's 174 school districts. SoUTHERN Eouc. REPORTING
SERV., supra note 7, at 28.
187 Guy Munger, Integration Held Slow in N.C., GREENSBORO DAILY NEws, Oct. 2, 1960, at
1. Moreover, almost half the total number of transfer requests that had been granted were in
Wayne and Craven Counties and involved primarily the children of non-southern military personnel. North Carolina Advisory Committee, supra note 170.
188 Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found the North Carolina assignment plan to be constitutional as written. The
Fourth Circuit found the plan facially constitutional, leaving open the question of whether it
would be applied by local school boards in a constitutional manner. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d
724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). The North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, as well, noting that:
nothing in the Brown case requires that children of different races be taught in the same
schools. The doctrine therein declared, to be put into effect in specific cases 'with deliberate
speed' as conditions may warrant, is that no child, whatever his race, may be excluded from
attending the school of his choice solely on the basis of race.
Constantian v. Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163, 167 (N.C. 1956).
Indeed, no North Carolina court ruled in favor of black students seeking admission to a
white school until1960 and then only for a handful of children in Yancey County who had been
required to make an 80 mile trip on mountain roads to attend a black school in a neighboring
county. Griffith v. Board of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.N.C. 1960).
189 Pete Gilpin, N.C. Leads South in Desegregation Cases Pending or Proposed, NAACP Told
Here, AsHEVILLE CmzEN, Oct. 10, 1959, at 10.
190 See supra note 12.
191 In 1961, a court in a North Carolina school desegregation case found for the first time that
a black child had been denied assignment to a white school because of his race. Vickers v.
Chapel Hill City Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 97, 101 (M.D.N.C. 1961). Although not required to
do so by the court order, the Chapel Hill Board of Education responded by becoming the first
school district in the South to adopt a plan of assigning black students to school on a geographic
rather than racial basis, which resulted in several black students attending a majority white
school. Davis B. Young, Historic Integration Plan Adopted for Chapel Hill School District,
CHAPEL HILL WKLY., July 6, 1961, at 1. Nevertheless, the Chapel Hill school district, home to
the University of North Carolina, was unusually liberal relative to much of the state.
192 The state's cynical manipulation of moderation did not escape the notice of the CharlotteMecklenburg Council on Human Relations: "[I]t seems increasingly clear that initial token desegregation, rather than paving the way for future compliance, is becoming a means of evasion of
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B.

Why North Carolina's Token Integration Succeeded

But if the Brown decision declared segregated education unconstitutional, why did the lower courts in North Carolina, charged with
carrying out the Brown mandate, refuse to require school boards to
cease race-based pupil assignments and to grant the transfer requests
of black students? The reasons are essentially threefold: the failure
of the Supreme Court to insist on meaningful desegregation, the
dearth of plaintiffs ready to challenge segregation practices, and the
willingness of the lower courts to conclude that token integration and
the absence of statements of defiance indicated that the state was operating its schools in a nondiscriminatory manner.
First, the Supreme Court failed to give lower court judges detailed guidance in enforcing the Brown mandate. Although the second Brown decision in 1955 concerned itself in large measure with the
issue of enforcement, the decision offered little in terms of specific
direction. In a statement that offered great comfort to southerners
intent on resisting compliance, the Court noted: "Full implementation
of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local
school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems...." 193 Significantly, the Court did not impose any timetable on desegregation efforts, rejecting the Justice Department's proposed ninety-day
timetable for the submission of desegregation plans.194 The Court instead merely indicated that school boards should make a "good faith"
start toward desegregation and should proceed "with all deliberate
speed." Not surprisingly, the second Brown decision was greeted with
relief throughout the South. 195
Furthermore, following the second Brown decision, the Supreme
Court largely abandoned the school desegregation field for the next
several years, seriously undermining compliance efforts.196 Between
1955 and 1960, the Supreme Court issued only one full opinion in a
public school desegregation case-in the crisis situation of Little
Rock197-and a few other per curiam decisions and affirmances. 198
the law." Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council for Human Relations, School Board Must Move Toward Full Compliance, NEw SoUTH, Dec. 1959, at 11.
193 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
194 Brief of the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief, Brown v.
Board of Education, in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 768.
195 WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 64.
196 Admittedly, during this time period the Court was active in striking down state-supported
segregation in a broad range of public facilities. See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
(buses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
197 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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For the most part, the Court's decisions came in extraordinary cases
where the very authority of the federal courts was challenged and
Supreme Court intervention demanded. Otherwise, the Court remained silent on a large number of issues concerning school desegregation, such as the need for plaintiffs to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief and the validity of one-gradeper-year desegregation plans, notwithstanding widely divergent decisions in the lower courts on these and other issues. 199 In cases where
the Court did speak, it reaffirmed the general principles of Brown, but
declined to offer specific guidance to lower courts on how to enforce
198 Besides the full opinion in Cooper, the Court issued five per curiam decisions between
1955 and 1960 in school desegregation cases. 1\vo were earlier procedural decisions in the
Cooper case. Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566 (1958) (refusing to stay district court order prior to
consideration by court of appeals); Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (announcing decision in Cooper
pending later full opinion). 1\vo were per curiam affirmances of three-judge court decisions
declaring unconstitutional certain state statutes that interfered with school desegregation.
United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 500 (1960) (per curiam) (affirming lower court decision
striking down a Louisiana statute which asserted that Supreme Court decisions in school segregation cases were a usurpation of state power); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959) (per
curiam) (affirming lower court decision striking down an Arkansas statute giving the Governor
the authority to close schools that were scheduled for desegregation). Finally, the Court affirmed a three-judge court's determination that the Alabama pupil placement statute was constitutional on its face. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (per
curiam).
At the same time, between 1956 and 1958, the Court denied certiorari in at least a dozen
school desegregation cases. Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 11 YALE LJ. 1520, 1524 n.10 (1968).
199 On at least three occasions, the Court declined to review conflicting lower court decisions
regarding the constitutionality of a one-year-at-a-time desegregation plan. In two of the cases,
the lower court approved of such a plan, while a third court disapproved. Kelley v. Board of
Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (approves); Slade v. Board of
Educ., 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958) (approves); Evans v. Ennis, 281
F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961) (disapproves).
Likewise, the Court denied review in two cases in which lower courts had differed on the
need for desegregation plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The Fifth
Circuit held that exhaustion of state remedies was not required before initiating litigation. See,
e.g., Mannings v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 277 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1960). The Fourth Circuit
disagreed. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Holt
v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959). Not until
1963 did the Supreme Court consider the exhaustion of remedies issue and hold that exhaustion
of state remedies was not a prerequisite to a suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief in a
school desegregation case. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
Finally, the Court failed to resolve the split in the lower courts on the permissibility of
allowing transfers from a school where a student was in a racial minority to one where a student
was in a racial majority. The Sixth Circuit permitted such transfers, Kelley v. Board of Educ.,
270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959), but the Fifth Circuit did not. Boson v.
Rippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960).
On occasion, some justices tried to have the Court consider additional school cases, but
without success. See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Educ., 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (Justices Warren, Douglas, and Brennan dissenting from. denial of certiorari in case in which lower court approved a
plan allowing minority to majority transfers).
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its mandate. Calls for the high Court to offer more guidance to lower
courts went unheeded.2 oo
The Supreme Court had initiated a "second reconstruction" with
the Brown decision, but had left it to southern federal judges to supervise the accompanying social revolution with little guidance or support. The failure of the Court to at least reconcile conflicting lower
court opinions, if not offer further guidance as to what Brown required, made the job of the federal district court judge charged with
the responsibility of overseeing desegregation decrees all the more
difficult.201 As a consequence, in the face of considerable local pressure from segregationists,Z02 many state and federal judges simply refused to order school boards to desegregate their schools.
The second reason for the dearth of successful school desegregation lawsuits in North Carolina during the first decade after Brown
was the difficulty in bringing such litigation. Many black parents did
not wish to send their children to white schools because of fears of
mistreatment and hence had no interest in litigation seeking to force
such admission. Moreover, several of the black parents who did sign
petitions asking for desegregation or file lawsuits in the early years
after Brown were subjected to harassment or some type of retaliation
that discouraged further litigation.203 The difficult transfer procedures
that the courts obliged black students challenging their pupil assignments to follow, coupled with the substantial expense and expertise
required to support litigation, made it virtually impossible to mount a
200 See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 4, at 209 ("It will be beneficial if the Court gives a new and
unified sense of direction to the lower judges, and it will, incidentally, also be helpful if the Court
exerts itself to keep the few opposition judges in line.").
This reluctance continued in the 1960s. The Court issued only two full opinions in southern
school desegregation cases from 1960 to 1964, one in the exceptional Prince Edward County,
Virginia, school closing case, Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and the other one
striking down minority-to-majority transfer provisions that gave students the right to leave a
desegregated school, but no corresponding right to enter one. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
683 (1963). The Court did issue per curiam opinions in a few other cases, most of which pertained to the fierce resistance to school desegregation attempts in Louisiana. See, e.g., Calhoun
v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964); St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); City of
New Orleans v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961); Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569, aff'd
sub nom. City of New Orleans v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961).
201 See generally PELTASON, supra note 107; JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC
STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME
CouRT's BROWN DECISION INTO A REvoLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981).
202 See PELTASON, supra note 107, for discussion of pressure on southern judges to resist
implementation of the Brown decision.
203 See, e.g., Letter from L.R. McKnight to Kelly Alexander (Sept. 14, 1954) (on file with the
Kelly Miller Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte);
Minutes, N.A.A.C.P. Board of Directors, Nov. 9, 1959 (on file with the NAACP Papers, Box IIIA-279, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (NAACP offers financial assistance to black parent who faced foreclosure in retaliation for his request for a transfer of his children to a white
school); Lamanna, supra note 77, at 57.
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successful legal challenge to a pupil assignment without some type of
organizational support. Moreover, until the 1964 Civil Rights Act authorized the Justice Department to file school desegregation suits, the
NAACP was the only organization committed to challenging school
segregation through litigation.204 Even though the North Carolina
General Assembly ultimately declined to enact anti-NAACP legislation, the attacks on the organization and its members in North Carolina restricted its effectiveness and undermined the willingness of
black plaintiffs to step forward and pursue legal remedies.205 By 1960,
the NAACP had managed to bring only eleven school desegregation
lawsuits in the entire state of North Carolina.206
The final reason why North Carolina's "moderate" response to
the Brown decision survived judicial challenge until the 1960s was the
ability of local school boards to utilize both the complicated transfer
process and the few instances of token integration to deflect claims
that the state still maintained a dual school system. The North Carolina courts established early on that black plaintiffs seeking assignments to white schools would be entitled to no judicial relief unless
they went through the detailed transfer and administrative appeal process established by the state pupil assignment statute.2 o7 This exhaustion requirement proved to be a major hurdle; virtually every judicial
204 And yet the NAACP was under constant attack in the South throughout the 1950s as the
organization faced a region-wide campaign to crush it. The more typical elements of the struggle
were legislative attempts to require the organization to disclose its membership lists and to prevent the organization from financing litigation. WASBY ET AL., supra note 8, at 181-92; Murphy,
supra note 98. Although virtually all of this legislation was eventually declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, the legislation effectively ended NAACP activity for a few years in much
of the South, particularly in Alabama. Southern NAACP membership declined by almost 40%
between 1955 and 1957. ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
BLACK CoMMUNmES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 33 (1984); NAACP, PROGRESS AND
PoRTENTS: NAACP ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1958, at 5 (1958).
205 Moreover, the organization experienced other forms of harassment in the state. Shortly
after the second Brown decision in 1955, a white segregationist group, the Patriots of North
Carolina, filed charges with the Secretary of State's office alleging that the organization had
failed to register with the state as an out-of-state organization seeking to influence public policy;
the organization ultimately agreed to pay a $500 fine for failure to register. State NAACP Unit
Failed to Register, Eure is Informed, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Nov. 15, 1955, at 10; $500
Check Paid State by NAACP, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Apr. 2, 1957, at 1.
206 See supra note 189.
207 For example, in Carson v. Board of Educ., 227 F.2d 789,790 (4th Cir. 1955), the Fourth
Circuit held that "[w]here the state law provides adequate administrative procedure for the protection of such rights, the federal courts manifestly should not interfere with the operation of the
schools until such administrative procedure has been exhausted and the intervention of the federal courts is shown to be necessary." See also Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 727 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Covington v. Edwards, 165 F. Supp. 957, 959 (M.D.N.C.
1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1960); Holt v. Raleigh City
Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853, 862 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 818 (1959); Joyner v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1956); Constantian v. Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. 1956).
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challenge to school segregation considered by a North Carolina state
or federal court during the 1950s was ultimately dismissed on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed in some manner to exhaust administrative remedies.208 At the same time, the fact that such transfers were possible and that a few black students did actually receive
transfers enabled the courts to conclude that the North Carolina assignment plan passed constitutional muster, despite the fact that every
school child in North Carolina was still assigned to school on the basis
of race. 209 Thus, by 1960, no North Carolina federal or state court had
ever ruled in favor of a black plaintiff in a school desegregation
case.210 By the same token, courts during the 1950s struck down pupil
assignment practices in other southern states that had excluded all
black children from white schools as part of a well-orchestrated strategy of massive resistance, and ordered black students admitted into
208 The United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded in a 1962 study that the principal obstacle to desegregation in the South was the requirement that black plaintiffs adhere to the
complicated administrative processes contained in the pupil placement statutes, UNITED STATES
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 15.
209 Significantly, shortly after the three North Carolina school systems opened in the fall of
1957 with limited desegregation, a three-judge court in Alabama considered the constitutionality
of the Alabama pupil placement statute. Pursuant to that statute, no black child had ever been
assigned to a white school, but the state argued that such assignments were certainly possible. In
upholding the constitutionality of the Alabama statute as written, the court noted that the North
Carolina placement statute, similar to the Alabama one, had resulted in admission of black students to white schools. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 381-82
(N.D. Ala. 1958). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court's decision.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 385 U.S. 101 (1958) (per curiam).
In denying black plaintiffs a right to attend a white school, the courts relied in large measure
on an early and important gloss on the Brown decision from one of the South's most distinguished judges-John Parker of Charlotte. Parker had served more than 30 years on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and had been nominated for a seat on the United
States Supreme Court by Herbert Hoover. Parker, in language that was seized upon throughout
the South as casting an important limitation on Brown, wrote the following in 1955:
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in
the schools or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of
choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, and all it has decided, is that a state
may not deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains . . . . The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination.
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (emphasis added). Parker's dicta would
be cited again and again throughout both North Carolina and the South for the next decade as
legitimating assignment plans pursuant to which no black child was ever assigned to a white
school.
210 There had, however, been a number of attempts to desegregate the schools in North Carolina, all of which the courts rejected. See, e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 727 {4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Covington v. Edwards, 165 F. Supp. 957 (M.D.N.C.
1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 780 {4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of
Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 95 {4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818
(1959); Joyner v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1956); Constantian v.
Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163 {N.C. 1956).
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white schools.211 North Carolina, which studiously avoided pronouncements of defiance in conjunction with well-publicized acts of
token integration, had demonstrated that a carefully orchestrated policy of "moderation" could well serve both the cause of segregation as
well as the state's economic interests.
V. CoNcLusioN
The South successfully resisted meaningful implementation of the
Brown decision until the mid-1960s.212 Most southern states did so in
dramatic fashion, publicly pledging with great fanfare to resist all attempts to force pupil mixing on an unwilling region. Yet a few southern states like North Carolina assumed a posture of "moderation" in
the wake of the Brown decision, motivated by a desire to preserve the
economic benefits of a progressive reputation on matters of race and
to prevent extensive court-ordered desegregation.
Ultimately, this policy of moderation succeeded. Lower courts
throughout the 1950s refused to strike down North Carolina's pupil
placement system notwithstanding the fact that virtually no black children ever won entry into a white school. North Carolina's perceived
willingness to comply with the Brown decision allowed the state to
mask its own form of resistance, which, though not as dramatic as that
of its southern neighbors, was equally effective. By the end of the first
decade after Brown, the schools of North Carolina were no more integrated than those of the more defiant southern states.213 Nevertheless, North Carolina had managed to preserve its moderate racial
image and was enjoying the benefits of that image in terms of increased new business. In a region historically beset with profound ironies when it came to matters of race, this result could not have been
surprising.
211 For example, in January 1957, a federal judge in Norfolk declared the Virginia pupil placement statute-pursuant to which no black student had ever entered a white school-unconstitutional, a decision that the Fourth Circuit affirmed a few months later. Adkins v. School Bd. of
Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
855 (1957). Similar actions were taken in Louisiana and Arkansas. See United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 500 (1960) (per curiam); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
212 Efforts to increase southern school desegregation received an enormous boost when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI of that statute provided that no recipient of
federal funds could discriminate on the basis of race. As a result, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) began an extensive effort to compel southern school districts to
end their segregative practices in exchange for the continued receipt of federal funds. The
amount of school desegregation in the 11 states of the old Confederacy dramatically increased
after 1964 in response to HEW pressure. See generally GARY 0RFJELD, THE REcoNSTRUCTION
OF SoUTIIERN EDUCATION (1969); James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42 (1967).
213 Similarly, the schools of the other moderate states of Tennessee and Texas were still almost completely segregated by the tenth anniversary of the Brown decision. SoUTIIERN Eouc.
REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 29.
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